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Essays on Economics of Education
Viviana Rodriguez Andrade
This dissertation consists of three studies on the economics of education and labor economics. The
first essay seeks to deepen understanding of high school student engagement and effort response
to changes in incentives. Changing the incentives students face is one lever for educators and
policymakers to improve student learning in the presence of student disengagement. A statewide
postsecondary admission policy which changes minimum college admissions standards for North
Carolina high school students wishing to attend college in-state provides a setting to test how stu-
dent effort responds to incentive structures. Regression discontinuity estimates show that students
respond to the admission policy by increasing GPA and decreasing absences and suspensions.
These effects suggest an increase in student engagement, however, the boost in GPA is driven by
changes in course composition, with students substituting away from more demanding coursework.
These unintended consequences of admission policies on student course-taking decisions can lead
students to miss important learning opportunities in high school, possibly generating detrimental
effects on student postsecondary success.
The second essay, coauthored with Hugh Macartney and Eric Nielsen, analyzes the effect of
the Great Recession on racial employment inequality in the United States. It is well understood
that adverse economic shocks affect workers non-uniformly. We explore a new channel through
which unequal employment outcomes may emerge during a downturn: the extensive margin of
establishment deaths. Intuitively, workers who are concentrated in less resilient establishments
prior to an economic decline will be disproportionately affected by its onset. Using rich employ-
ment and establishment data, we show that black workers bore the brunt of the Great Recession in
terms of within-industry employment changes arising from establishment deaths. This finding has
important implications for the evolution of worker disparities during future downturns.
Finally, the third essay, coauthored with Clive Belfield and Brooks Bowden, examines the use
of benefit-cost analysis by the federal government on education regulations from 2006 to 2015.
Benefit-cost analysis is an important part of regulatory decision-making, yet there are questions
as to how often and how well it is performed. Here we examine 28 Regulatory Impact Assess-
ments performed by the federal government on education regulations since 2006. We find many
Regulatory Impact Assessments estimated costs, albeit using informal methods, but most failed to
adequately report benefits. Also, most studies did not estimate net present value or clearly report
methodological assumptions. In reviewing the relatively high quality studies we identified a num-
ber of discrepancies from best practice. Most importantly, few Regulatory Impact Assessments
attempted a social benefit-cost analysis: Most examined ”administrative burdens” from compli-
ance with legislation. This alternative focus on administrative burdens has significant implications
for economic evaluation in practice.
Together, these essays advance what we know about higher education policy, labor market pol-
icy, and means of evaluating policies in both fields.
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Chapter 1
Student Effort Response to Shifts in
University Admission Policies
1.1 Introduction
Incentive structures that shape student behavior in K-12 education, such as postsecondary admis-
sion policy, are abundant in education settings. Nonetheless, education economists and policy-
makers lack an understanding of the ways in which these incentive structures can shape student
responses.
A change in admission requirements in one of the largest university systems in the U.S. provides
a salient and high-stakes setting to examine how student effort responds to incentive structures. In
an attempt to improve graduation rates at UNC campuses and prevent dropouts by only admit-
ting college-ready students, the UNC Board of Governors set minimum GPA and SAT admission
standards across the system in 2009, generating a discontinuity in the incentives for effort for
high school students. Given that students take the SAT exam before completing their coursework,
students right below and right above the threshold faced different returns to their effort in their
remaining high school coursework.
Under a regression discontinuity design, I leverage rich administrative data for the universe of
1
high school students in the state of North Carolina to compare the effort allocation of students right
above and below the SAT threshold.1 I find that students just above the SAT threshold have less
12th grade absences (-18.5%) and suspensions (-27.4%) than students right below. This suggests
that students just above the threshold realize the possibility of a UNC college opportunity and
increase effort in the form of attendance and good behavior. At the same time, students just above
the SAT threshold obtain 12th grade GPAs that are 2.8% higher than students right below and are
more likely to express intent to enroll ”in-state” after high school. However, higher student GPA
can reflect either changes in effort allocation or substitution away from more demanding courses.
In fact, I find that higher GPAs of students right above the SAT cutoff are driven by changes in
course composition as students substitute away from less demanding courses.
Furthermore, I find that minority and less affluent students just above the cutoff have higher
effort allocations via decreased absences and suspensions but engage to a lesser extent in gaming
practices via course selection. This is consistent with the way the new admission standards affected
admission practices across UNC campus selectivity. New admission cutoffs likely changed admis-
sion practices for the least selective campuses in the system which predominately serve minority
students. These results are also consistent with Black and Hispanic students being less likely to
have institutional knowledge and access to support systems such as academic counseling (Kirst
and Venezia, 2004).
This paper contributes to three main strands of the literature on student effort and the incen-
tives embedded in postsecondary education access policies. First, I show that students do change
their effort in response to incentives. Student effort is a key contributor to academic success.2 Yet,
1I follow previous literature and use student absences and suspensions as inverse proxies for effort and student
GPA as an outcome that is a function of student effort (Hastings et al., 2012).
2Perhaps the strongest evidence of this relationship is provided by Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008) who
collect data on study time for first-semester college students at Berea College. The authors document strong positive
causal effects of student effort on student GPA under an instrumental variable research design that exploits random
assignment of roommates that are likely to exert low levels of effort. Measurement of student effort in K-12 settings
is limited, mainly due to lack of data availability. However, the importance of effort in K-12 setting, as proxied by
student absences and suspensions, still holds. Students who are absent and violate school rules are more likely to
have poor grades and achievement and are less likely to graduate high school or enroll in college (Liu et al., 2019;
Goodman, 2014; Christenson et al., 2012; Easton et al., 2017).
2
educators struggle to keep students engaged in schoolwork.3 Incentive structures shape student
behavior and can be important levers available to educators and policymakers to encourage stu-
dents’ investments in school. However, there is limited evidence of the ways in which students
respond to incentives in K-12 settings. Generally, education accountability policies seek to shift
incentives for effort of teachers and schools rather than students. Thus, there have not been many
opportunities to evaluate the student incentive-effort connection outside of researcher designed
pay-for-performance incentives schemes (Kremer et al., 2009; Fryer, 2011; Bettinger, 2010).4
Incentive structures embedded within policies for access to higher education provide an alter-
native, more realistic, setting to examine student effort. A recent and growing literature documents
these high school student responses to incentives schemes embedded in postsecondary admission
policies with a focus on percent plan programs (such as the Texas Top 10% program). For ex-
ample, there is evidence of increased student effort and learning for Texas high school students
as a response to the implementation of the Texas Top 10% program (Golightly, 2019; Cortes and
Zhang, 2012). This paper instead evaluates salient and high-stakes shift in incentives for students
at the lower end of the test score distribution who are more at risk of not obtaining postsecondary
education.
Second, this paper expands on the above literature on student effort response to incentives by
examining the channels through which students can adjust their behavior. In particular, I show
that strategic course selection is an important dimension of student effort adjustments. These
unintended consequences of admission policies can lead students to miss key learning opportunities
in high school, which can have detrimental effects on future postsecondary outcomes and go against
the policymaker’s intent (Tincani et al., 2020).
While unintended consequences of incentives have been studied extensively in the literature of
3Barriers to students’ optimal allocation of effort have been studied extensively in behavioral economics of edu-
cation. These barriers include hyperbolic discounting (Bettinger and Slonim, 2007), present-bias behavior (Castillo
et al., 2011; Wulfert et al., 2002; Harackiewicz et al., 2012), social norms and negative identities (Akerlof and Kranton,
2002; Eble and Hu, 2018), among others. For a review of the literature see Lavecchia et al. (2016).
4A notable exception is Fruehwirth (2013) who exploits a student accountability policy change in the state of
North Carolina that required fifth grade students to achieve above a certain level to be automatically promoted to the
next grade. Fruehwirth (2013) finds that this policy induced students in danger of scoring below the threshold to exert
more effort in order to pass to the next grade.
3
education accountability programs, the focus has been on evaluating teacher and school response.5
Unintended consequences of student response has been explored considerably less, but are ob-
served in the evidence on percent plan programs which shows they might induce students to sort
into lower-achieving high schools (Cullen et al., 2013), decrease student effort for seniors who
already know their admission guarantee (Leeds et al., 2017), and decrease effort for students who
overestimate the probability of being in the top of their class (Tincani et al., 2020).
Third, I show substantial heterogeneity of student response to incentives across demographic
characteristics. While scarce in K-12 setting, the literature examining student response to incen-
tives in postsecondary settings is abundant, with a focus on incentives generated by performance
standards, merit aid requirements, and academic probation in college (Angrist et al., 2009; Lindo
et al., 2010; Scott-Clayton, 2011; Casey et al., 2018; Cornwell et al., 2003).6 This literature high-
lights how incentives have heterogeneous effects across student demographics and performance.
In line with the findings of this literature, I find that minority and less affluent students increase
effort via decreased absences and suspensions but engage to a lesser extent in gaming practices via
course selection.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the Minimum
Admission Requirement policy implemented by the UNC Board of Governors in 2009 and doc-
uments changes in admission practices across campus selectivity. Section 1.3 describes the data
used in the analysis, and provides summary statistics. Section 1.4 establishes the research design
and estimation procedure, as well as the method used for recovering bounds of regression discon-
tinuity estimates which are presented as part of the validity exercises in Section 1.6. I present
regression discontinuity results in Section 1.5 and conclude in Section 1.7.
5Unintended consequences of teacher and school accountability programs include: focusing on marginal students
(Reback, 2008; Neal and Schanzenbach, 2010), teaching to the test (Jacob, 2005; Glewwe et al., 2010; Koretz, 2002),
shifting away from untested subjects (Jacob, 2005; Dee and Jacob, 2011; Glewwe et al., 2010), manipulating student
test pool (Cullen and Reback, 2006; Figlio, 2006), distorting effort across grades (Macartney, 2016), among other
responses.
6This literature finds that incentives generated by postsecondary policy can induce students to increase effort but
also induce students to strategic behavior such as strategic course-taking, course withdrawal, and effort allocation




University of North Carolina System is one of the largest university systems in the U.S., enrolling
approximately 225,000 students in 16 university campuses across the state of North Carolina.
Upwards of 70% of all Bachelor’s degrees earned in the state of North Carolina are issued by the
UNC system and around 85% of all UNC first-time freshmen undergraduate students are in-state
students (UNC, 2015).
Beginning with the entering freshman class of 2009, in an attempt to improve graduation rates at
all UNC campuses and prevent dropouts by only admitting college-ready students, the UNC Board
of Governors set minimum admission standards for all campuses. These minimum admission stan-
dards consisted of a cumulative high school GPA of 2.5 and an SAT score of 800 or an ACT score
of 177. The SAT score requirement was based on the sum of the critical reading and mathematics
subtests, a sum that has a possible range of 400-1600. For the reminder of this paper, SAT test
scores presented will reflect this measure instead of the full SAT score which also includes the
writing subtest.
The UNC Board of Governors implemented these requirements gradually starting with a cutoff
of 2.0 GPA and a 700(15) SAT(ACT) score for the 2009 admission season. The cutoffs increased
in 2011 to a GPA of 2.3 and an SAT(ACT) score of 750(16). Finally, the 2013 admission season
cutoffs increased to the final target. Figure 1.1 shows how this transition was implemented over
time. Note that the policy was first implemented in 2009 and affected UNC admission eligibility
of students graduating high school in the Spring of 2009 and beginning college in the Fall of 2009.
Therefore, the high school graduating cohort of 2009 presents the cleanest natural experiment to
examine student response to incentives as, for these students, 12th grade performance was the only
potential dimension of adjustment to this policy. Therefore, the focus of this paper will be on this
7Before 2009, UNC had no official minimum GPA, SAT, or ACT admission requirements. However, the system
had required applicants to have a minimum high school course requirement since 2006. These requirements consisted
of 4 credits of math, 4 credits of English, 3 credits of science, 2 credits of social studies, and 2 credits of language. After
2009, minimum GPA, SAT, and ACT requirements were implemented in addition to minimum course requirements.
Any given campus could grant exceptions to these new requirements to up to 1% of their admitted pool.
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cohort of students.
Figure 1.1: UNC System Minimum Admission Requirements
A key feature of the UNC system is its substantial variation of selectivity across campuses.
Given this variation, the minimum admission requirement policy might not have been binding
for the most selective institutions within the system. I draw from IPEDS data to address this
concern and explore campus-level trends in selectivity based on SAT test scores8. Admission
officers at each institution report to IPEDS the 25th percentile SAT performance of their admitted
undergraduate student pool for each academic year. Figure 1.2 presents the trend over time of 25th
percentile SAT scores for the bottom and top five UNC campuses in terms of SAT scores.
Figure 1.2: 25th Percentile SAT of Admitted Students
(a) Bottom 5 Campuses (b) Top 5 Campuses
Notes: This figure shows the evolution of the 25th percentile SAT score for admitted students of UNC campuses over time. Panel
(a) shows the evolution for the bottom five campuses. Panel (b) shows the evolution for the top five campuses. The dash red line
represent the year in which the UNC Minimum Admission Requirements were implemented. Source: IPEDS
Panel (b) of Figure 1.2 shows how the new admission policy is unlikely to affect admission
decisions for campuses that belong to the most selective campuses as only 25% of their admitted
8Similar trends are found when ACT 25th percentile scores are used instead of SAT scores (See Figure A.1).
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pool scored SATs below 1040. However, Panel (a) of Figure 1.2 shows that the UNC admission
policy is likely to change admission decisions for the least selective institutions as 25% of their
admitted applicant pool score below 750 on the SAT. In fact, least selective campuses increase
their 25th percentile SAT scores of their admitted pool beginning in 2009. Furthermore, these
campuses predominately serve minority students, which is a possible mechanism that explains
heterogeneity in treatment effects found in Section 1.5.3.
1.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
I rely on rich administrative data from the North Carolina public schools. These data are stored
and managed by the North Carolina Education Research Data Center (NCERDC). I am able to
form an unbalanced panel of approximately 75,000 public high school students belonging to the
graduation cohort of 2009. These data allow me to capture key information on student outcomes
that proxy effort and engagement. These proxies include student GPA, credit-taking, absences and
suspensions.
GPA and credit-taking patterns are recovered from administrative records of high school student
transcripts. These transcripts record information on the courses taken by each student, the subject,
the academic level (e.g. honors, AP, etc.) and the final mark obtained9. Information on absences
are collected by the state of North Carolina for accountability purposes during each testing period
(end of Fall and Spring terms). Finally, data on student suspensions come from administrative
records on reportable incidents10.
In addition to key behavior proxies, the NCERDC data also includes information of student SAT
performance on their latest administration from 2009 to 2013. I also observe students’ answers to
the SAT questionnaire, which provide information on students’ postsecondary plan at the time of
their SAT administration.
9Although high school transcripts are available going back to the 2004-05 school year, coverage on transcript
reporting increases over time until it becomes universal for the 2008-09 school year.
10Schools in North Carolina are required to report any incidents that occur within the school that lead to a student
suspension, expulsion and/or transfer to an alternative learning program.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive Statistics
RD Sample Full Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean SD Obs Mean SD Obs
Panel A. Student Demographics
Female 0.61 0.49 3,745 0.52 0.50 75,656
Economically Disadvantaged 0.58 0.49 3,750 0.38 0.48 75,720
White 0.28 0.45 3,750 0.63 0.48 75,720
Black 0.61 0.49 3,750 0.26 0.44 75,720
Hispanic 0.05 0.21 3,750 0.05 0.23 75,720
Asian 0.03 0.16 3,750 0.02 0.15 75,720
Student with Disability 0.09 0.28 3,750 0.09 0.28 75,720
Academically Gifted 0.02 0.15 3,750 0.21 0.41 75,720
Took SAT 1.00 0.00 3,750 0.52 0.50 75,720
SAT Score 718.08 40.36 3,750 1004.80 190.87 39,222
Panel B. Pre-Treatment Effort and Engagement Outcomes
GPA 9th Grade 2.63 0.61 3,392 3.02 0.87 67,313
GPA 10th Grade 2.53 0.61 3,441 3.00 0.92 68,629
GPA 11th Grade 2.56 0.63 3,555 3.07 1.00 71,061
Credits 9th Grade 8.28 1.65 3,393 8.07 1.53 67,347
Credits 10th Grade 8.25 1.59 3,441 8.06 1.52 68,649
Credits 11th Grade 8.17 1.57 3,556 7.97 1.52 71,081
Absences 9th Grade 4.91 4.75 3,399 5.48 5.60 67,269
Absences 10th Grade 5.64 5.53 3,500 6.39 6.37 69,541
Absences 11th Grade 6.51 6.34 3,645 7.48 7.77 72,103
Suspensions 9th Grade 0.23 0.84 3,453 0.18 0.78 68,261
Suspensions 10th Grade 0.18 0.71 3,531 0.17 0.71 69,979
Suspensions 11th Grade 0.18 0.72 3,662 0.17 0.74 72,623
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics of the data. Panel A. provides summary statistics of student demographics. Panel B. provides
summary statistics of student effort and engagement outcomes in pre-treatment years (pre 12th grade). Columns 1 through 3 show descriptive
statistics of the sample used for the estimation of the main results shown in Table 1.2 using the optimal bandwidth estimated for GPA. Columns
4 through 6 show descriptive statistics of the all students belonging to the graduating cohort of 2009.
Table 1.1 provides an overview of the data for high school students belonging to the graduating
cohort of 2009. Columns (1) through (3) present descriptive statistics for students who score close
to the UNC cutoff on their SATs. These students make up the regression discontinuity sample,
which are the data used for the main estimates of this paper. Columns (4) though (6) present
descriptive statistics for the full graduating cohort of 2009.
Overall, students close to the UNC cutoff are more likely to be female, economically disad-
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vantaged (EDS)11, and more likely to be African American compared to the full cohort of North
Carolina public school students. Furthermore, they are less likely to have a disability or be classi-
fied as academically gifted. By construction, all students in the RD sample take the SAT and score
less than the average student who takes the SAT. Finally, in terms of pre-treatment effort measures,
students belonging to the RD sample generally have lower measures of engagement and perfor-
mance. They have lower GPAs, take slightly more coursework, are most absent, and are suspended
more times than their counterparts throughout their high school years.
1.4 Research Design
This section details the empirical framework of this paper. I first describe the regression disconti-
nuity design and estimation used for the main estimates which are presented in Section 1.5. I then
describe the framework used to set identify regression discontinuity estimates in the presence of
potential manipulation of the running variable following Gerard et al. (2020). Estimates of these
bounds are presented in Section 1.6.
1.4.1 Regression Discontinuity Design
The sharp cutoffs set by UNC’s new minimum admission requirements policy, I argue, generated
changes in incentives for effort for students close to the cutoff. Students that score just below the
SAT requirements have a zero probability of admission to any UNC campus. However, students
who score just above, perceive a positive probability of admission. Therefore, the probability of
admission to a UNC campus has a discontinuous jump at the policy cutoff. Students who perceive
this jump in the probability of admission will have increased incentives to perform well during their
remaining academic coursework. Several mechanisms could drive the change in student behavior
at the cutoff. Students can choose to exert more effort in order to meet the UNC GPA admission
requirement once they’ve fulfilled the SAT requirement. Students can also choose to exert more
11As proxied by student eligibility for free or reduced-price lunch.
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effort in their remaining coursework to further increase probability of admission via increased
GPAs. Finally, passing the first UNC requirement might increase motivation and effort regardless
of student strategic behavior with respect to the admission policy.
I use student SAT test score data under a regression discontinuity framework to leverage quasi-
random variation from students’ SAT scores to compare effort of students who perform on either
side of the threshold. Students just above and just below the SAT cutoff can be thought to be
similar on several dimensions except for their UNC admission eligibility.
The regression discontinuity specification is given by:
yi = γ + βDi + f (S ATi,Di) + εi (1.1)
where i indexes students. The variable yi represents the 12th grade outcome of interest, Di is a
treatment indicator variable that takes the value of one when students’ SAT score meet the relevant
UNC cutoff. S ATi represents students’ performance on their first SAT test and is the running
variable of this specification. The estimated coefficient, β̂, should be interpreted as the effect
differential incentives embedded in the UNC admission policy on student engagement during their
senior year.
Throughout this paper, estimation of Equation (1.1) is carried out via local linear regression
(Gelman and Imbens, 2019), using optimal bandwidths and robust confidence intervals proposed
by Calonico et al. (2014). Because optimal bandwidths are estimated separately for each student
outcome, the number of observations in each estimation may vary. However, estimates are robust
to bandwidth selection (see Appendix A.2). Finally, standard errors are clustered at the individual
levels of the running variable to correct for misspecification due to discrete running variable (Lee
and Card, 2008).
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1.4.2 Regression Discontinuity Bounds under Manipulated Running Vari-
able
A first order concern of the estimation presented in Equation (1.1) is the fact that I do not observe
all student SAT administrations. Instead, I only observe the last one. Student SAT retaking can
be an important source of endogeneity if students systematically retake the SAT in order to place
themselves to the right of the cutoff to gain UNC admission eligibility. This selection into the
right side of the cutoff can be an important threat to the internal validity of the regression discon-
tinuity design presented in Equation (1.1)12. I address this concern by bounding the regression
discontinuity point estimates following Gerard et al. (2020).
Gerard et al. (2020) develop a framework to estimate sharp bounds of regression discontinuity
treatment effects under a potentially manipulated running variable. For the purposes of this paper,
consider two types of students: manipulators (Mi = 1) and non-manipulators (Mi = 0). Manipula-
tors have perfect control of the side of the cutoff they are in and manipulate in only one direction.
Therefore, manipulators can perfectly retake the SAT until they are on the right side of the cutoff
and they will never retake to be on the left side of the cutoff. Under this setting, the parameter of
interest is the treatment on the treated for non-manipulators13:
Γ0 = E(Yi(1) − Yi(0)|Xi = c,Mi = 0)
= E(Yi|Xi = c+,Mi = 0) − E(Yi|Xi = c−,Mi = 0)
(1.2)
Note that, because manipulation is assumed to have one direction (students retake the SAT to
be on the right side of the cutoff), we know that E(Yi|Xi = c−,Mi = 0) = E(Yi|Xi = c−). However,
we cannot identify the term E(Yi|Xi = c+,Mi = 0) of Equation 1.2, because on the right side of
the cutoff we cannot disentangle manipulators from non-manipulators. Therefore, we cannot point
12In the past, studies that use SAT scores as the running variable in regression discontinuity designs, as for example,
Goodman et al. (2017), find no differences in estimated treatment effects when using students’ first and last SAT
administration scores.
13The treatment effect for manipulators cannot be recovered as, by assumption, all manipulators on the right side
of the cutoff and are treated (Gerard et al., 2020).
11
identify Γ0. However, we can bound it using the estimated proportion of manipulators (τ) that is
identified from the data:




To understand why the proportion of manipulators (τ) is identified from the data, Figure 1.3
presents an illustration of the density of a manipulated running variable. All students to the left of
the cutoff are non-manipulators by definition. However, students on the right side of the cutoff are
both manipulators and non-manipulators. Since manipulators are able to control the side on the
cutoff they are in, this generates a discontinuity of the density of the running variable at the cutoff.
This discontinuity represents the proportion of students who manipulate the running variable.
Figure 1.3: Identification of Manipulators
Non-manipulators Manipulators + Non-manipulators
Proportion of manipulators (τ)
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
Density of Xi Density of Xi,Mi = 0
Notes: This figure presents an illustration of how the proportion of manipulators can be recovered from the data. Source: Gerard
et al. (2020).
Using the proportion of manipulators, lower bounds can be derived by trimming quantile (1−τ)
of the outcome distribution, and therefore, excluding units with the highest outcomes from the
estimation. Analogously, upper bounds can be derived by trimming quantile τ of distribution, and
excluding the units with the lowest outcomes. Then, sharp lower and upper bounds on Γ0 are given
12
by:
ΓL0 = E(Yi|Xi = c
+,Yi ≤ QY |X=c+(1 − τ)) − E(Yi|Xi = c−)
ΓU0 = E(Yi|Xi = c
+,Yi ≥ QY |X=c+(τ)) − E(Yi|Xi = c−)
(1.4)
where QY |X is the conditional quantile function of the outcome variable. Estimation of both
the density function and the conditional quantile are carried out via a local linear polynomial
approximations. For more detailed explanation of estimation and inference see Gerard et al. (2020).
1.5 Results
This section presents regression discontinuity estimates of Equation (1.1) for the 2009 cohort. First,
I present core results on student effort and engagement proxies in Section 1.5.1. Then I present
mechanisms in Section 1.5.2, by exploring effects on student course-taking patterns. Finally, in
Section 1.5.3, I present heterogeneity of the results across student demographics and aspirational
postsecondary plans.
1.5.1 Core Results
In this section, I present results for estimating Equation (1.1) for the 2009 cohort of students.
Panels (a) through (d) of Figure 1.4 plot average 12th grade GPA, absences, times in suspension,
and credit-taking for each SAT score bin with a global linear fit on either side of the 700 cutoff14.
Visual evidence provided by these plots suggest a possible student response on 12th grade GPA,
absences, and times in suspension.
Table 1.2 presents regression discontinuity estimates of Equation (1.1) for GPA, absences, sus-
pensions, and credit-taking in Columns (1) to (4), respectively. These estimates indicate that stu-
14The UNC minimum admission requirements sets a GPA threshold that is based on students’ high school weighted
GPA. Weighted GPA assigns additional grade points for Honors and AP/IB courses. I use weighted GPA instead of
raw GPA as an outcome variable is to reflect this policy. However, Appendix A.3 shows that results are robust to using
raw GPA as the outcome.
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Figure 1.4: Global Linear Fit
(a) 12th Grade Weighted GPA (b) 12th Grade Absences
(c) 12th Grade Times in Suspension (d) 12th Grade Number of Courses Taken
Notes: This figure shows discontinuities in senior-year weighted GPA, absences, times in suspension, and course-taking (Panels (a),
(b), (c), and (d). All panels are created by plotting the average outcomes across each SAT score bin and fitting the data using a linear
regression without controls on either side of the cutoff.
dents who score just above the UNC SAT minimum admission threshold obtain GPAs that are,
on average, 0.08 points higher compared to students who score just below. This represents an
increase of 2.8% from the control group mean and an increase of 0.11 standard deviations. In
addition, threshold crossing also reduces absences by 1.5 days (0.19 SD) and suspensions by 0.07
times (0.09 SD). Finally, Column (4) shows that there is no statistically significant effect on the
number of courses students take in 12th grade. Overall, these results suggest an increase in student
engagement as a result of the perceived changes in incentives brought by the policy.
Another dimension of student behavior that might shift as a result of meeting the UNC SAT
cutoff is students’ aspirations. Table 1.3 presents evidence of this. During the Spring of 12th
14
Table 1.2: Effects on Student Effort and Engagement Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GPA Absences Suspension Credits
RD Estimate 0.078** -1.479*** -0.074* -0.084
(0.026) (0.172) (0.030) (0.060)
Bandwidth 79.40 65.40 82.34 90.29
Observations 3,748 2,836 4,298 4,858
Control Mean 2.75 8.00 0.27 7.50
Control SD 0.68 7.98 0.78 1.92
Notes: This table shows regression discontinuity estimates of senior-year GPA, course-taking, absences and days in suspension.
Optimal bandwidths are selected following Calonico et al. (2014). Local linear regressions are estimated on either side of the cutoff.
Standard errors are clustered at the individual levels of the running variable to account for misspecification due to discrete running
variable (Lee and Card, 2008). * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
grade, all seniors in the state of North Carolina are surveyed and asked to report where they are
bound for after high school graduation. From the responses to this survey, I can back out whether
students report they are bound to a 4-year institution and whether the institution is a public in-state
institution (UNC campus).
A concern with these data is that they are self-reported and can reflect intentions rather that
actual transitions. As, I cannot actually observe where students enroll after high school graduation,
I present these results with that caveat. While not statistically significant, estimates presented in
Table 1.3 provides evidence that threshold crossing increases students’ likelihood of reporting they
are bound for a UNC campus by 0.08 percentage points (0.14 SD) and increases the likelihood of
reporting they are bound for a 4-year institution by 0.05 percentage points (0.10 SD).
1.5.2 Mechanisms
I interpret decreased absences and suspensions shown in Table 1.2 as a reflection of increased
engagement in school work due to the discontinuity in the probability of admission. Nevertheless,
interpretation of increased student GPA is less straightforward. Students can increase their GPA
by either exerting more effort in their coursework or by substituting away from more demanding
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Table 1.3: Effects on Student Reported Intentions After High School
(1) (2)
Bound UNC Bound 4-year
RD Estimate 0.075 0.045
(0.039) (0.032)
Observations 4806 4298
Control Mean 0.31 0.45
Notes: This table shows regression discontinuity estimates of senior-year reporting of their intentions after High School. Optimal
bandwidths are selected following Calonico et al. (2014). Estimated bandwidths for UNC-going and 4-year going intentions 95.50
and 84.58, respectively. Local linear regressions are estimated on either side of the cutoff. Standard errors are clustered at the
individual levels of the running variable to account for misspecification due to discrete running variable (Lee and Card, 2008). *
p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
courses.
I explore this mechanism by splitting the effects on student overall GPA and course-taking into
core and non-core subjects. I define core courses as courses in the subjects of English, Math,
Science, and Social Studies. Non-core courses are all other course subjects. Presumable, course-
taking in core subjects is more demanding. Panel A. of Table 1.4 presents regression discontinuity
estimates for core and non-core GPA and course-taking in 12th grade.
Overall, effects of student GPA seem to be driven by increases in student GPA from non-core
courses. Additionally, Columns (3) and (4) of Table 1.4 indicate that students are substituting away
from core credit-taking and increasing course-taking in non-core subjects. Threshold crossing
decreases core-course credit-taking by 0.225 (6.4%) credits while it increases non-core credit-
taking by 0.221 credits (5.5%). I disaggregate these results further by presenting changes in credit-
taking due to threshold crossing across core subjects in Panel B. of Table 1.4. Threshold crossing
induces students to take less courses in math, social studies, and ELA. However, effects are larger
and statistically significant for diminished credit-taking in social studies and ELA.
While Panels A and B of Table 1.4 provide evidence that students are substituting away from
more demanding coursework as they cross the SAT cutoff, course subject categories are broad and
might not be a precise measure of course difficulty. To address this concern, I recover school-
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Table 1.4: Effects for Credit-Taking
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Outcomes Across Core and Non-Core Subjects
Weighted GPA Credits
Core Non-Core Core Non-Core
RD Estimate 0.022 0.087* -0.225*** 0.221***
(0.018) (0.039) (0.049) (0.028)
Panel B. Credit-Taking Across Core Subjects
Math Science Social ELA
RD Estimate -0.014 -0.005 -0.084* -0.109***
(0.046) (0.040) (0.034) (0.008)
Notes: This table shows regression discontinuity estimates of senior-year GPA, course-taking of core and non-core courses. I define
core courses as courses in the subjects of English, Math, Science, and Social Studies. Non-core courses are all other course subjects.
Optimal bandwidths are selected following Calonico et al. (2014). Estimated bandwidths for core GPA, non-core GPA, core credits,
and non-core credits are 77.31, 100.7, 59.4, and 51.76, respectively. Estimated bandwidths for math, science, social studies, and
ELA course-taking are 91.10, 80.85, 58.13, and 64.61, respectively. Local linear regressions are estimated on either side of the
cutoff. Standard errors are clustered at the individual levels of the running variable to account for misspecification due to discrete
running variable (Lee and Card, 2008). * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
year-course-level grade averages. With these averages, I classify a course as an ”A course”, if
on average, students obtain an A in that course. I do the analogous classification for ”B courses”
and ”C courses”. I then recover the number of courses students take for each category. Table 1.5
presents regression discontinuity estimates on these variables. Even though none of the estimates
are statistically significant, the direction of the coefficients follow the same underlying mechanism
shown in Table 1.4. Students seem to be taking more courses where, on average, students obtain
an A, and less courses where, on average, students obtain an C.
Overall Tables 1.4 and 1.5 suggest that students are substituting away from more demanding
coursework as they cross the threshold and therefore, effects on GPA presented in Table 1.2 might
not fully reflect increased effort but rather strategic course choice intended to boost 12th grade
GPAs.
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Table 1.5: Credit-Taking Effects Across Average A, B and C courses
(1) (2) (3)
A-Courses B-Courses C-Courses
RD Estimate 0.119 -0.047 -0.043
(0.073) (0.051) (0.061)
Observations 3115 3142 2230
Notes: This table shows regression discontinuity estimates of senior-year course-taking across courses for which students on average
obtain an A (Column (1)), a B (Column (2)), and a C (Column (3)). Optimal bandwidths are selected following Calonico et al.
(2014). Estimated bandwidths for A, B, and C courses are 88.67, 90.29, 69.07, and 57.57, respectively. Local linear regressions are
estimated on either side of the cutoff. Standard errors are clustered at the individual levels of the running variable to account for
misspecification due to discrete running variable (Lee and Card, 2008). * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
1.5.3 Heterogeneity
In this section I explore heterogeneity of the effects across different student populations. First, I
explore heterogeneity effects across student demographics. Table 1.6 presents estimates of Equa-
tion (1.1) of GPA, absences, and times in suspension across student race, SES, and gender.
Columns (2) and (3) present regression discontinuity estimates for white and non-white stu-
dents, respectively. Differences across these two groups are statistically significant for GPA, sus-
pensions, core and non-core credit-taking. Thus, these results suggest that minority students re-
spond to the incentives embedded by the UNC admission policy by obtaining higher GPA’s while
at the same time engaging in less strategic course-taking compared to the response of their coun-
terparts. Columns (4) and (5) presents results for students who are economically disadvantaged
and students who are not, respectively. Statistically significant differences across these two groups
include absences, suspensions, core and non-core course-taking. These results suggest that low
income students that make the SAT cutoff have higher effort and engage in less strategic course-
taking than their counterparts. However, this change in behavior does not translate into higher
GPAs.
Finally Columns (6) and (7) present estimate for female and male students, respectively. Sta-
tistically significant differences across these two groups include GPA, absences, suspensions, non-
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Table 1.6: Effects Across Student Demographics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Full White Non-White EDS Non-EDS Female Male
Panel A. Effort and Engagement Outcomes
GPA 0.078** 0.045 0.086*** 0.071 0.055 0.043 0.175***
(0.026) (0.077) (0.021) (0.037) (0.126) (0.032) (0.052)
Absences -1.479*** -0.915 -1.523*** -1.802*** -0.706 -1.935*** -0.247
(0.172) (1.145) (0.427) (0.435) (0.703) (0.495) (0.432)
Suspensions -0.074* 0.023 -0.095* -0.152* 0.090 -0.080*** -0.072
(0.030) (0.045) (0.039) (0.049) (0.068) (0.026) (0.064)
Panel B. Student Credit-Taking
Core -0.225*** -0.449*** -0.119 -0.102 -0.358** -0.220*** -0.193
(0.049) (0.103) (0.073) (0.081) (0.130) (0.028) (0.130)
Non-Core 0.221*** 0.566*** 0.122*** 0.156 0.201 0.095* 0.374***
(0.028) (0.061) (0.034) (0.103) (0.119) (0.043) (0.051)
Notes: This table shows regression discontinuity estimates of senior-year GPA across student demographics. Optimal bandwidths are selected following
Calonico et al. (2014). Local linear regressions are estimated on either side of the cutoff. Standard errors are clustered at the individual levels of the
running variable to account for misspecification due to discrete running variable (Lee and Card, 2008). * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
core course-taking. These results suggest that male students engage in more gaming practices via
course selection and obtain higher GPAs than female students without increased effort.
As discussed in Section 1.2, the new admission requirements were likely to affect admission de-
cisions of the least selective campuses within the UNC system which predominately serve minority
students. As such, the heterogeneity results found in Table 1.6 are in line with minority and less
affluent students responding more strongly to the policy because the foresee changes in admission
practices of the UNC campuses they were intending to attend. Furthermore, these results are also
consistent with Black and Hispanic students being less likely to have institutional knowledge and
access to support systems such as academic counseling (Kirst and Venezia, 2004).
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Table 1.7: Effects Across Student Postsecondary Plans
(1) (2) (3)
Full UNC Non-UNC
Panel A. Effort and Engagement Outcomes
GPA 0.078** 0.158 -0.025
(0.026) (0.085) (0.063)
Absences -1.479*** -1.308 -1.681
(0.172) (0.797) (1.049)
Suspensions -0.074* -0.102* -0.041
(0.030) (0.046) (0.037)
Panel B. Student Credit-Taking
Core -0.225*** -0.144* -0.266***
(0.049) (0.073) (0.079)
Non-Core 0.221*** 0.470*** -0.109
(0.028) (0.079) (0.122)
Notes: This table shows regression discontinuity estimates of senior-year GPA, absences and times in suspension for students all
students in Column (1), for students who want to attend a UNC campus in Column (2), and for students who do not want to attend
a UNC campus in Column (3). Optimal bandwidths are selected following Calonico et al. (2014). Local linear regressions are
estimated on either side of the cutoff. Standard errors are clustered at the individual levels of the running variable to account for
misspecification due to discrete running variable (Lee and Card, 2008). * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Second, I explore heterogeneity across students’ postsecondary plans. Presumably, students’
effort allocations are unaffected by the UNC admission policy if they have no intention to attend
a UNC campus. I draw from student survey response from the SAT Questionnaire that is given
to students prior to their SAT administration. This survey asks students about their postsecondary
plans. Students report if they want to attend a public or private university, whether they want to
attend a 2-year or 4-year institution, and whether they want to attend an institution in their home
state. Answers to these questions allow me to back out whether students want to attend a UNC
campus or not.
Table 1.7 provides regression discontinuity estimates for GPA, absences, and times in suspen-
sion for students who want to attend a UNC campus and for students who do not. Differences
across these two groups are all statistically significant for all student outcomes except for ab-
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sences. Overall, effects seem to be driven by students who want to attend a UNC campus as
threshold crossing generates a greater increase in GPA and a greater decrease in suspensions than
their counterparts. These results are in line with the the idea that the UNC admission policy change
shifted students incentives for effort for those students who did want to attend a UNC campus. For
students who did not, there are no perceived changes in incentives for their effort in school work.
1.6 Internal Validity Checks
My results show that the discontinuity in the probability of admission to a UNC campus, generated
by the 2009 admission policy shift, led students to the right of the cutoff to have higher effort
levels, as proxied by absences and suspensions, but also led students to substitute away from more
demanding coursework in order to boost their GPAs. The ability of my research design to produce
causal estimates of these effects rests on the assumption that validity holds. An important threat
to the validity of this design is student SAT retaking. Because I am only able to observe students’
latest SAT administration, if students retake the SAT until they meet the UNC cutoff, then my
results might be reflecting selection into SAT retaking rather than effects on student effort. In this
section, I provide four types of evidence based on observables to address this validity concern.
First, I explore whether there is evidence of manipulation of the running variable which could
be driven by SAT retaking. I implement a local polynomial density test following Cattaneo et al.
(2019). This test estimates a local polynomial density on either side of the cutoff and tests for the
null hypothesis that the limit of both functions when they approach the cutoff from either side are
equal. Figure 1.5 presents the fit of the local polynomial density functions and the histogram of the
SAT test scores. With a p-value of 0.376, I am not able to reject the null hypothesis that the density
functions are equal at the cutoff. Therefore, this test provides evidence that there is no systematic
manipulation of the running variable.
The second type of evidence examines the relevance of the policy cutoff. The idea behind this
exercise is the following: if students are responding to the UNC admission policy, I should not find
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Figure 1.5: Local Polynomial Density Test
Notes: This figure shows the histogram of the SAT test scores in blue bars and the local polynomial density estimation on either side
of the cutoff in red solid lines estimated following Cattaneo et al. (2019).
Table 1.8: Regression Discontinuity Bounds of Effects on Student Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
670 680 690 700 710 720 730
GPA 0.057 -0.030 -0.025 0.078** 0.053 0.026 0.015
(0.033) (0.039) (0.029) (0.026) (0.035) (0.019) (0.015)
Absences 0.665* -0.147 -0.717 -1.479*** -0.485 0.628* 0.644
(0.266) (0.332) (0.446) (0.172) (0.514) (0.263) (0.359)
Suspensions -0.124 -0.015 -0.019 -0.074* -0.048 0.067* 0.033
(0.064) (0.073) (0.045) (0.030) (0.032) (0.031) (0.038)
Notes: This table shows regression discontinuity estimates of senior-year GPA, absences and times in suspension for different SAT cutoffs.
Optimal bandwidths are selected following Calonico et al. (2014). Local linear regressions are estimated on either side of the cutoff. Standard
errors are clustered at the individual levels of the running variable to account for misspecification due to discrete running variable (Lee and
Card, 2008). * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
discontinuity of student outcomes on values of the running variable other than the relevant cutoff
of 700. Table 1.8 presents evidence that this is the case. Discontinuity of student outcomes are
only found in the relevant UNC admission policy cutoff.
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Figure 1.6: Discontinuity in Student Demographics and Pre-Treatment Covariates
Notes: This figure shows regression discontinuity estimates of Equation (1.1) using standardized pre-treatment student covariates
and outcomes as the dependent variable. Robust 95% confidence intervals are estimated following Calonico et al. (2014). I apply
the Bonferroni correction to adjust significance for multiple comparisons. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
The third type of evidence for validity examines covariate smoothness across the cutoff. Figure
1.6 regression discontinuity estimates of Equation (1.1) using standardized pre-treatment student
covariates and outcomes as the outcome variable. Scatter plots of these covariates, analogous
to the ones shown in Figure 1.4 can be found in the Appendix A.4. Across most estimates, I
find no evidence of a discontinuity except for two covariates: 8th grade math test scores and 9th
grade GPA. Discontinuities in these variables could be driven by SAT retaking if higher achieving
students systematically retake the SAT in order to be on the right side of the cutoff.
Despite evidence of no systematic manipulation of the running variable given by the local poly-
nomial density test implemented in Figure 1.5, discontinuities of 8th grade math test scores and
9th grade GPA found in Figure 1.6 could indicate systematic manipulation of the running variable
if the density test is underpowered to detect jumps in the density functions. In order to address
this concern, I present a fourth type of evidence for validity that recovers bounds for the regression
discontinuity estimates found in Table 1.2 under the framework presented in Section 1.4.2. These
bounds are presented in Table 1.9. Overall, the estimated bounds of the regression discontinuity
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Table 1.9: Regression Discontinuity Bounds of Effects on Student Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GPA Course-Taking Absences Suspension
RD Estimate 0.078** -0.084 -1.479*** -0.074*
(0.026) (0.060) (0.172) (0.030)
Bounds [0.069, 0.094] [-0.135, -0.053] [-2.351, -1.190] [-0.108, -0.074]
Density Jump 0.007 0.006 0.037 0.007
Notes: This table shows regression discontinuity estimates of senior-year GPA, absences and times in suspension for students all students in
Column (1), for students who want to attend a UNC campus in Column (2), and for students who do not want to attend a UNC campus in
Column (3). Optimal bandwidths are selected following Calonico et al. (2014). Local linear regressions are estimated on either side of the
cutoff. Standard errors are clustered at the individual levels of the running variable to account for misspecification due to discrete running
variable (Lee and Card, 2008). * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
results are fairly tight. The reason why the bounds are fairly tight is due to the fact that the actual
jump in density at the cutoff is estimated to be small.
As explained in Section 1.4.2, regression discontinuity estimates are bounded using the esti-
mated proportion of manipulators, τ, to trim upper and lower tails of the outcome distribution.
This proportion is identified by the discontinuity of the density function at the cutoff via Equation
1.3. In order to assess how sensitive the bounds are to the estimated density discontinuity, τ, Figure
1.7 presents how regression discontinuity bounds change as τ changes. As τ increases, the bounds
becomes larger. However, for most outcomes, the bounds are robust to the estimated proportion of
manipulators. The estimated bounds for student 12th grade GPA and student 12th grade absences
start to include zero after τ is set to be 9 times and 6 times the actual estimated value, respec-
tively. Furthermore, the estimated bounds for student 12th grade times in suspension never include
zero even if the estimated proportion of manipulators, τ, is set to be 10 times the actual estimated
value. Thus, it is unlikely that manipulation of the running variable via SAT retaking is such that
it completely drives away the results presented in Section 1.5.
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Figure 1.7: Sensitivity of Bounds to Estimated Density Discontinuities
(a) 12th Grade Weighted GPA (b) 12th Grade Absences
(c) 12th Grade Times in Suspension
Notes: This figure shows discontinuities in senior-year weighted GPA, absences and times in suspension (Panels (a), (b), and (c). All panels are
created by plotting the average outcomes across each SAT score bin and fitting the data using a linear regression without controls on either side of the
cutoff.
1.7 Conclusion
Changing the incentives students face is one lever for educators and policymakers to improve
student learning in the presence of student disengagement. However, education economists and
policymakers lack an understanding of the ways in which these incentive structures can shape stu-
dent responses. Generally, education accountability policies seek to shift incentives for effort of
teachers and schools rather than students. Thus, there have not been many opportunities to eval-
uate the student incentive-effort connection outside of researcher designed pay-for-performance
incentives schemes.
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Incentive structures embedded within policies for access to higher education provide an alterna-
tive, more realistic, setting to examine student effort. In this paper, I leverage exogenous variation
from a change in admission requirements in one of the largest university systems in the U.S. that
provided a salient and high-stakes setting to examine how student effort responds when incentive
structures shift.
Using rich administrative data from the North Carolina public school system, I evaluate whether
students’ investments in schoolwork shifted as a results of this exogenous shift in incentives for
effort. I find that students respond by increasing GPA and decreasing absences and suspensions.
While these effects suggest an increase in student engagement as a result of the admission policy,
further exploration of course-taking suggests that student increases in GPA are driven by changes
in course composition as students substitute away from more demanding coursework. These un-
intended consequences of admission policies on student course-taking decisions can lead students
to miss important learning opportunities in high school, possibly generating detrimental effects on
student postsecondary success. Finally, I find important heterogeneity of student response across
demographics. minority and less affluent students just above the cutoff have higher effort alloca-




Unequal Worker Exposure to Establishment
Deaths∗
(with Hugh Macartney† and Eric Nielsen‡)
Against a backdrop of rising inequality, the existence of labor market disparities between work-
ers is a key public concern. Economists have studied such disparities extensively, focusing on
trends in factors including differential productivity by worker type, the relative supply of workers,
unionization, and skill-biased technical change.1 Considerable attention has also been devoted to
understanding the labor market effects of economic shocks, with a view toward worker inequality
in several instances.2 However, existing research has yet to determine whether and how any given
∗The views and opinions expressed in this paper are solely those of the authors and do not reflect those of the
Board of Governors or the Federal Reserve System.
†Department of Economics, Duke University
‡Federal Reserve Board
1Altonji and Blank (1999) and Katz and Autor (1999) offer excellent reviews of the relevant literature. Seminal
early work includes Bound and Freeman (1992), Katz and Murphy (1992), Berman et al. (1994), Autor et al. (1998)
and Card and DiNardo (2002), among others. Some notable recent additions to the literature are Autor et al. (2008)
and Bayer and Charles (2018).
2A large literature examines how employment and earnings respond to changes in trade, government spending and
defense spending (see Blau et al. 2000; Aizer 2010; Autor et al. 2013; Nakamura and Steinsson 2014; Bertrand et al.
2015; Pierce and Schott 2016, 2017; Goldsmith-Pinkham et al. 2018). Though these analyses place little emphasis
on how labor outcomes might differ across worker types, several other works consider the effects of economic shocks
through the prism of worker inequality. These include Bound and Holzer (2000), which applies the methodology
proposed by Bartik (1991) and developed more fully by Blanchard and Katz (1992) to analyze decadal patterns in
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shock-inequality connection is mediated by preexisting worker-firm matching.3
In this article, we explore a new and potentially important channel through which adverse eco-
nomic conditions may affect inequality across workers: the extensive margin of establishment
deaths. If workers are matched to establishments non-randomly by type (e.g., by race), then the
type that is concentrated within establishments least able to survive the downturn will experience
a disproportionate share of the employment decline.4 Focusing on employment changes from
establishment deaths (as opposed to changes from non-closing establishments) is key for under-
standing the connection between worker inequality and pre-downturn matching, given that, by
definition, death-based changes cannot be affected by post-downturn employer favoritism toward
one worker group over another. We use the Great Recession, a downturn that was abrupt, deep,
and widespread, to uncover evidence of such sorting across establishments by demographic group.
Under our approach, the degree to which workers are differentially distributed according to un-
observable establishment resilience is revealed by the change in worker employment inequality
explained by establishment deaths.
The key methodological contribution of our paper is to recover the component of the change
in employment inequality that is explained by establishment deaths. In our context, this change
is defined as the difference across worker types (e.g., white vs. black) in the aggregate percent
change in employment over the Great Recession.5 As direct and nationally comprehensive mea-
sures of worker-specific employment changes arising from establishment deaths are unavailable,
we propose a method for statistically decomposing employment changes by worker type into four
inequality, as well as Couch and Fairlie (2010), Hoynes (1999), Hoynes et al. (2012) and Guvenen et al. (2014), which
investigate whether recessions have differential effects by worker type.
3A growing literature studies the contribution of worker-firm matching to increasing earnings inequality over time
(see Abowd et al. 1999; Card et al. 2013; Barth et al. 2016; Bonhomme et al. 2019; Song et al. 2019), but does not
consider how the relationship (or its employment analogue) is affected by large negative shocks.
4Research analyzing the effect of demand shocks on firm/establishment closures includes trade-oriented papers,
such as Yeaple (2005) and Egger and Kreickemeier (2009), which are not concerned with inequality per se and do
not address differences by race or gender. Syverson (2011) reviews a literature documenting substantial productivity
differences across firms within narrowly-defined industries.
5This measure differs somewhat from the metric commonly used in the literature: the change in a particular worker
type’s share of aggregate employment or earnings. Our variant is particularly conducive to analyzing demand shocks,
as it reveals how each worker type is separately affected. In the case of the standard metric, it is not apparent whether
an increase in the share of total employment for a particular type is due to growth for that type or to a contraction in
total employment.
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mutually exclusive and exhaustive components: those due to establishment deaths, births, contrac-
tions, and expansions. The approach exploits variation in each of these establishment-level causes
while imposing restrictions so that the overall predicted employment changes by type and by cause
match those observed in the data.6
With the decomposition in hand, we adapt the well-established procedure from the literature
for isolating across- and within-industry variation,7 separating the overall employment change
attributed to establishment deaths into across and within components. These terms intuitively
depend on the type-specific employment changes and employment shares at the industry level; the
across component is a function of the average employment changes across types and the differences
in shares by type, while the within component is a function of the differences in employment
changes by type and the average employment shares across types. While the extent to which
establishment deaths can explain across-industry patterns is interesting, focusing on the within-
industry changes is particularly informative. Doing so rules out the deaths effects from being
driven by a correlation between industry-specific preferences and industry vulnerability to demand
shocks.
We apply our empirical framework to employment data from the Census Quarterly Workforce
Indicators (QWI), broken down by worker type (e.g., race), geography, and industry (at the NAICS
four-digit level). These publicly available data cover the vast majority of private sector employment
for virtually all counties in the United States for the years surrounding the Great Recession. Our
near-universal coverage is important – in order to identify the aggregate effect on worker inequality,
it is necessary to trace out how every industry and every county is impacted by the Great Recession,
rather than a subset. We supplement the QWI with Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB) data
from the Census on the number of establishment deaths, births, contractions, and expansions by
county and four-digit NAICS.8 We then link this establishment information to employment shifts
6While our decomposition method accounts for all categories of establishment-level cause, our establishment
death results are especially prominent, given that it is the only component for which the employer cannot exercise
discretion in firing.
7See Freeman (1975), Freeman (1980), Katz and Murphy (1992), Berman et al. (1994), Autor et al. (1998), Dunne
et al. (1996), and Bernard and Jensen (1997).
8These data are not part of the standard SUSB distribution, but are available without restriction from Census for a
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by industry, county, and worker type.
Applying our decomposition method reveals substantial changes in employment inequality by
race over the Great Recession. In keeping with prior analyses, while all worker types lost em-
ployment, black workers were disproportionately affected by the downturn, with a decline that was
about 25% larger than the loss for white workers and approximately five-sixths larger than His-
panic workers. Black workers fared even worse with respect to employment losses stemming from
establishment deaths, losing at twice the rate of white and Hispanic workers.9
The decomposition into across- and within-industry components reveals that the more pro-
nounced employment losses for black workers were driven entirely by within-industry declines,
with white and Hispanic workers incurring greater losses as a result of their unfavorable preexist-
ing distribution across industries. More importantly, the within-deaths estimates indicate that black
workers were disadvantaged within industry precisely because they were concentrated in less re-
silient establishments prior to the recession. While not our primary focus, we also find that women
fared worse than men within industry, but the statistically insignificant within-deaths point esti-
mate is merely suggestive that women were disproportionately employed at weaker establishments
pre-recession.
Our work also relates to a prior literature that examines the effects of individual establishment
closures, arguing that these can be seen as natural experiments that allow researchers to evaluate
the wage losses that result from job separations.10 Our findings suggest that minority workers are
more likely to be employed at firms that are less resilient to negative shocks and more likely to
close. This has important implications for the interpretation of the estimates from this previous
literature, as it suggests that using individual establishment closures may produce highly local
treatment effects that do not necessarily generalize to other populations.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section sets out our framework for
nominal fee.
9Importantly, local establishment deaths are only modestly correlated with local employment declines – there is
meaningful variation in employment that is orthogonal to deaths. Our finding that deaths can explain a substantial
fraction of the change in inequality between various worker types is not tautological.
10See Couch and Placzek (2010) for a thorough review of this literature.
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exploring changes in inequality, detailing the procedure for determining the extent to which the gap
in the employment growth rates between worker types can be attributed to each establishment-level
cause (deaths, births, contractions, and expansions), as well as decomposing each gap into across-
and within-industry components. Section 2.2 describes the data used in our analysis, and provides
several stylized facts about the Great Recession. This lends context to our main empirical results,
which we present in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 then justifies our approach by formalizing the sources
and direction of potential bias, undertaking a sensitivity analysis, and assessing goodness-of-fit
using an out-of-sample exercise. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.1 Empirical Framework
This section details our empirical framework, introducing relevant notation when needed. We
first describe our novel statistical procedure for allocating employment losses to establishment
categories (deaths, births, expansions, and contractions). We then set out our framework for de-
composing changes in employment gaps over time into components that arise from across- and
within-industry variation. Finally, we discuss how we conduct inference in our setting via the
bootstrap.
2.1.1 Decomposition of Employment Changes by Establishment-Level Cause
We begin with the key methodological contribution of the paper: a method for using jurisdiction-
industry-level variation in establishment categories to generate predicted employment changes due
to each of these causes separately by worker type. Our headline estimates are then constructed by
feeding the predicted changes due to establishment deaths into the across-within industry decom-
position developed in the subsection that follows.
Let ∆Eτi j denote the change in the total employment of workers of type τ in industry i and
jurisdiction j between periods t = 0 and t = 1 (corresponding to 2007 and 2009, respectively,
in our context). Similarly, denote by θτi j the percent change in employment, and let θ
τ denote its
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aggregated counterpart (across i and j). The goal is to estimate the component of ∆Eτi j attributable
to establishment deaths.
Our approach depends on worker type-agnostic establishment category counts predicting re-
spective worker type-specific employment changes to a first-order approximation – we justify this
assumption in Section 2.4. Defining di j, bi j, ci j, and exi j to represent the number of establish-
ment deaths, births, contractions, and expansions, respectively, we recover the predicted changes
in employment by estimating the following equation for each worker type and industry:
∆Eτi j = β
τ
d,idi j + β
τ
b,ibi j + β
τ
c,ici j + β
τ
ex,iexi j + ε
τ
i j . (2.1)
Notably, our prediction equation omits an intercept, reflecting the fact that deaths, births, expan-
sions, and contractions are the only channels through which employment can change.
We could simply estimate equation (2.1) using OLS, weighting by industry-jurisdiction em-
ployment in period 0. However, our goal is to construct the best estimates we can for employment
changes due to each possible establishment change. To this end, we leverage additional informa-
tion to constrain our estimation of equation (2.1) and improve the quality of our predictions.
In particular, we make use of the fact that, at the industry level, we know the total change in
employment due to each type of establishment change, as well as the total change in employment
(irrespective of cause) for each worker type.11 For example, consider employment changes in
industry i due to establishment deaths. Given estimates β̂τd,i and β̂
τ′
d,i, our predicted industry-level




j di j and ∆̂Eτ
′




j di j. While
we do not observe the analogues of these changes in our data (which is the reason for carrying
out this estimation procedure in the first place), we do observe the total industry-level change in
employment due to establishment deaths, ∆Ei|d. Therefore, it is natural to make the following
restriction involving β̂τd,i and β̂
τ′
d,i:





= β̂τd,i + β̂
τ′
d,i . (2.2)
11See Section 2.2 for details.
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The restriction in equation (2.2) ensures that the total predicted loss across τ and τ′ due to an
establishment death equals the average employment loss per establishment death observed in the
data. Analogous restrictions apply for births, contractions, and expansions.
Similarly, any set of estimates for the parameters in equation (2.1) yield predicted overall
changes in employment separately for τ and τ′ workers which can be constrained to equal the
observed total employment losses by type:
∆Eτi = ∆̂E
τ
i |d + ∆̂E
τ
i |b + ∆̂E
τ






di j + β̂τb,i
∑
j
bi j + β̂τc,i
∑
j
ci j + β̂τex,i
∑
j
exi j . (2.3)
In total, we can impose up to six restrictions for each (τ, τ′) comparison (four restrictions as
per equation (2.2) and two restrictions as per equation (2.3)). However, we have found that the
optimization performs better (and is more stable across bootstraps) when the number of constraints
is reduced by one. Therefore, our estimation does not impose equation (2.2) for expansions, as the
expansion predictions are not of direct interest to us. Nevertheless, our estimated parameters yield
implied aggregate employment changes by firm expansions that are quite close to the observed
values.
It is worth emphasizing that because we cannot directly link employment in the QWI to par-
ticular establishments, the possibility remains that some of the employment losses we attribute
to establishment deaths are actually attributable to a different cause. Nonetheless, the close cor-
respondence between the predicted employment changes and the observed employment changes,
using an out-of-sample goodness-of-fit assessment (see Section 2.4 for details), coupled with the
fact that we simultaneously condition on all establishment variables, provides strong support for
our attribution. It is difficult to conceive of a driver of employment changes that is distinct from,
but correlated with, deaths and which would not be picked up by variation in births, contractions,
or expansions. Furthermore, Section 2.4 also shows that our results would be directionally un-
changed even in the face of significant bias in our estimates for the effects of establishment deaths
on worker type-specific employment.
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2.1.2 Decomposition of Employment Gaps by Industry
We now turn to the task of decomposing the across- and within-industry components of employ-
ment changes for different worker types during the Great Recession. Our measure of the overall
change in the employment gap between type-τ and type-τ′ workers is given by [θτ − θτ
′
]. To deter-
mine how much of this difference is due to within-industry and across-industry variation, we define
within-industry variation as arising from within-industry differences in type-specific growth rates:
that is, θτi , θ
τ′
i for some i. Across-industry variation can then be recovered from the difference
between overall and within-industry adjustments.









 (Eτi0/Eτ0) + (Eτ′i0/Eτ′0 )2
 . (2.4)
Intuitively, it is the across-industry sum of the difference in the employment losses by type, weighted













It is the across-industry sum of the difference in industry-i employment shares by type, weighted
by the (unweighted) average employment loss in i.
Note that the decomposition [θτ − θτ
′
] = [θτ − θτ
′
]W + [θτ − θτ
′
]A can be carried out using either
the observed employment changes by worker type (as in the explication above) or the changes
predicted from establishment deaths (or any other establishment cause).
2.1.3 Interpreting Significance Under the Bootstrap
We construct confidence intervals and p-values for all of our estimates using 5,000 bootstrap it-
erations, sampling at the jurisdiction (county) level. To our knowledge, we are the first paper to
conduct formal inference on across/within industry decompositions. While the construction and
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interpretation of the bootstrapped confidence intervals is straightforward, interpreting the p-values
is more complicated. The problem is two-fold.
First, we do not know the sampling distribution of our statistics under the relevant null hypothe-
ses, in part because many of these nulls are very likely not true. We address this difficulty by
following the recommended approach of shifting the bootstrapped distributions so that they are
centered around their respective nulls.
Second, shifting the bootstrapped distributions in this way assumes that they differ only in their
locations under different null and alternative hypotheses. We are unaware of any a priori reason
why this should be true, and the constraints we impose in our estimation (equations (2.2) and (2.3))
render simultaneous, independent shifts of constraint-linked bootstrapped distributions problem-
atic. Therefore, while we report both p-values and confidence intervals for the results presented in
Section 2.3, we view the confidence intervals as more reliable measures of the sampling variability
of our estimates.
2.2 Data and Stylized Facts
2.2.1 Measures of Employment and Establishment Deaths
Our measure of employment comes from the Quarterly Workforce Indicators (QWI; U.S. Census
Bureau 2019a), which is produced by the U.S. Census Bureau. The QWI provides local labor
market information (including employment) by quarter-year, jurisdiction (county), industry (four-
digit NAICS), and worker demographic (race, ethnicity and gender). These publicly available
data are aggregated from the matched employer-employee micro-level Longitudinal Employer-
Household Dynamics (LEHD) dataset, which is constructed using administrative records from
state unemployment insurance fillings, social security data, federal tax records and other Census
data. For our period of interest (2007-2009), the QWI data cover 95% of US private sector jobs
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and all but one state.12
We define each worker type from the QWI worker demographic characteristics. For race/ethnicity
comparisons, the categories “white” and “black” consist of white non-Hispanic and black non-
Hispanic workers, respectively, while “Hispanic” consists of Hispanic workers of any race. For
gender, the process is straightforward: workers are either male or female. Using these defini-
tions, we calculate the employment change during the recession for each worker type. While our
employment measures do not condition on full- or part-time status, we draw upon the American
Community Survey (ACS; Ruggles et al. 2019) to provide supplemental evidence that changes in
the share of part-time workers do not drive our results (see Appendix B.2.1).
The first column of Panels A and B in Table 2.1 reports descriptive statistics for the QWI data.
The sample contains 3,128 jurisdictions and 312 four-digit industries. It also covers 122 million
jobs, with total employment reported separately by worker type, industry and jurisdiction.
To complement our measure of employment, we exploit information about the number of es-
tablishment deaths, births, contractions, and expansions for each county and four-digit NAICS
industry code, using dynamic annual data from the Statistics of U.S. Businesses (SUSB; U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau 2019b).13 These data are constructed from the Business Information Tracking Series
(BITS), which longitudinally tracks each establishment in the United States across successive Busi-
ness Register records.14 Establishment deaths (births) are defined in the SUSB data as the number
of establishments that have positive (zero) employment in the first quarter of the initial year and
zero (positive) employment in the first quarter of the subsequent year. Establishment contractions
(expansions) are defined as the number of establishments that have larger (smaller) employment in
the first quarter of the initial year than in the first quarter of the subsequent year.
12The QWI data did not report information for Massachusetts until 2010. Only 31 states participate in the LEHD
program and, with the exception of a very small subset (8 as of this writing), restricted LEHD data must be obtained
on a state-by-state basis (with most researchers obtaining only between 14 and 17 states).
13SUSB data are extracted from the Census Business Register which collects data on all known single and multi-
establishment firms. These data come from several sources including the Economic Census, the Annual Survey of
Manufacturers, the Current Business Surveys, and the administrative records of the Internal Revenue Service, the
Social Security Administration, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
14Establishments that have undergone no ownership or organizational changes are matched across years according
to their Census identifier. BITS is also able to match those that do change using Employer Identification Numbers,
business names and addresses, and industry codes. Doing so guards against over-counting deaths or births.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics
QWI Sample SUSB Subsample











Average by Industry 391,245 392,666
(792,667) (788,487)
Average by Jurisdiction 39,024 36,430
(149,751) (141,356)






Notes: The QWI sample contains labor market outcomes for the universe of industries and counties across all
states (except for MA) and the time period 2007-2009. The merged QWI-SUSB data used for the analysis is
a subsample of the QWI sample, since the SUSB establishment data contain a slightly smaller subset of indus-
tries and counties. The SUSB initial establishment count pertains to 2007, while the changes (deaths, births,
contractions and expansions) are from 2007 to 2009. Panels A and B present descriptive statistics for 2007.
For our primary analysis, we merge the QWI data for 2007-08 and 2008-09 with SUSB estab-
lishment data for the corresponding years, forming the “SUSB Subsample” detailed in the second
column of Table 2.1. Comparing the two columns, the subsample used for the analysis includes
over 99.6% of jurisdictions and 92.6% of industries in the QWI data, accounting for 93% of total
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employment in the United States. The employment shares of each worker type are similar across
samples. Panel C of Table 2.1 reveals that there are about 6.5 million establishments in our sample,
with a higher rate of establishment deaths (contractions) than births (expansions) during our period
of interest, as one would expect during a deep recession.
As one might assume during a period of low aggregate demand, employment changes and es-
tablishment deaths are correlated at the county level. However, the correlation is relatively small
(-0.26), indicating that there are substantial employment changes at the county level that are orthog-
onal to establishment deaths. Births, contractions, and expansions are also correlated somewhat
with county-level employment changes, with correlations of 0.07, -0.27, and 0.45, respectively.
2.2.2 Stylized Facts about the Great Recession
Before discussing our main results decomposing employment changes during the Great Recession
into across- and within-industry components, as well as components stemming from establishment
deaths, we present a number of motivating facts about the period of interest.
The Great Recession substantially impacted establishment deaths and births. The SUSB data
reveal that establishment deaths began to increase in 2006, peaking in 2008 and 2009 during the
height of the recession. Births, by contrast, rose in 2006 and 2007 before falling substantially
during the recession. These establishment changes generated intuitive and significant employment
changes, with the employment losses from deaths rising and the gains from births falling during
the Great Recession, relative to their prior trends (see Online Appendix Figure B.5).
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(a) Aggregate by Race (b) Across/Within, White vs. Black
Figure 2.1: Aggregate Employment Trends and Decomposition by Worker Race
Notes: Panel (a) of this figure shows the quarterly evolution of seasonally adjusted employment by race (white, black, and Hispanic)
from 2001 to 2016 inclusive. Panel (b) shows the evolution of the across and within components of the observed difference in the
percent change in employment between black and white workers from 2001 to 2016 inclusive. We seasonally adjust employment
trends using seasonal adjustment software by the US Census Bureau, entitled “X-13-ARIMA-SEATS.” Employment trends for the
full population of workers (irrespective of race) are presented in Online Appendix Figure B.4.
Panel (a) of Figure 2.1 presents aggregate employment trends using the QWI data for white,
black, and Hispanic workers from 2001Q1 to 2016Q4. These seasonally-adjusted employment
trends show that while white workers experienced a sizable decrease in employment, their recovery
following the Great Recession was faster than the recovery experienced by black workers. These
trends also show that Hispanic workers fared the best of the three groups, in terms of having both
a comparatively shallow decline during the recession and a very robust recovery.
While all worker types and most industries experienced declines during the Great Recession,15
these losses were not even. Some industries were much more heavily affected than others, and
variation in worker composition by industry, implies that the “across” inequality channel is likely
to be important in many cases.16 Moreover, in some industries, the Great Recession differentially
affected worker types, suggesting that the “within” channel may frequently be salient as well.17
We now use the decomposition framework set out in Section 2.1 to understand how across- and
15Several industries actually experienced employment increases during the Great Recession (e.g., health, manage-
ment services).
16As noted, worker types concentrated in industries particularly affected by the Great Recession will fare worse
than those that are not.
17See figures in Online Appendix B.6.
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within-industry employment inequality evolved between 2001 and 2016. In particular, we want to
know whether the Great Recession had a pronounced effect on the across and within components,
by assessing the extent to which there was a trend break during that time. Doing so isolates the
effect of the demand-side recessionary shock from other long-run changes (e.g., prior trends and
lagged effects of earlier shocks), which we assume continue to operate during the downturn. This
provides suggestive evidence for the formal analysis that follows in Section 2.3.
Panel (b) of Figure 2.1 plots the year-over-year across and within components for the com-
parison between white and black workers. Changes in the across component generally contribute
relatively little to the larger overall employment decline for black workers during the recession.
Rather, this larger relative decline is mainly driven by the within component, which spiked from
negative to positive during the recession. Black workers experienced much greater employment
losses than white workers within industries during the downturn and had much greater employment
growth at the industry level during the recovery. Interestingly, the across component does dip down
slightly during the recession – the differential distribution of white and black workers across indus-
tries and the differential employment declines experienced by different industries on net partially
counteracted the within-industry forces. For periods outside of the recession, the within component
is mostly negative, consistent with faster employment growth experienced by black workers dur-
ing the non-recession years. The patterns are similar for the white-Hispanic comparison (available
upon request).
2.3 Main Results
In this section, we present our headline decomposition results. The previous section showed that
the Great Recession generated substantial changes in employment inequality, with the within-
industry component harming black workers and the across-industry component helping them. We
now report formal estimates of these effects and then assess the degree to which they can be ex-
plained by establishment deaths. We carry out this analysis by implementing the various decom-
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positions set out in Section 2.1.
Table 2.2: Employment Change Decompositions by Race











Panel B: Across-Within Comparisons (White vs. Black)
Total Deaths
[θw − θb]A -0.011*** -0.011
[-0.013,-0.009] [-0.028,-0.003]
(0.000) (0.179)
[θw − θb]W 0.025*** 0.091***
[0.021,0.028] [0.062,0.139]
(0.000) (0.000)
Panel C: Across-Within Comparisons (White vs. Hispanic)
Total Deaths
[θw − θh]A 0.013*** -0.014***
[0.010,0.016] [-0.021,-0.006]
(0.000) (0.001)
[θw − θh]W -0.032*** 0.010
[-0.039,-0.027] [-0.023,0.055]
(0.000) (0.579)
Notes: Panel A presents employment changes during the Great Recession (2007-2009) by
worker race, both in total (agnostic to the establishment-level cause) and for those arising
from establishment deaths. White, black and Hispanic workers are denoted by w, b and h,
respectively. Panel B and C presents estimates of equations (2.4) and (2.5) for the white-
black and white-Hispanic comparison, respectively, both in total and for establishment
deaths. 95% confidence intervals and significance are calculated using 5,000 bootstrap
iterations. Confidence intervals are reported in square brackets and p-values are reported
in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
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We first consider the total employment changes (“Total”) by worker race, as well as the corre-
sponding changes predicted from establishment deaths (“Deaths”). Panel A of Table 2.2 presents
these results, which show how different workers fared over the Great Recession without adjust-
ing for the distribution of employment across industries. Black workers lost modestly more total
employment during the recession than white workers (7.2% versus 5.8%). Hispanic workers fared
somewhat better, with total employment losses (3.9%) that were about two-thirds those of white
workers. However, the deaths-based component paints a different picture: white and Hispanic
workers lost about the same employment from establishment deaths (8.4% and 8.1%, respectively),
but black employment declined by nearly twice as much in percentage terms (16.5%). The larger
employment decline from establishment deaths for black workers suggests that they were particu-
larly concentrated in less resilient establishments at the onset of the recession.
Having established the overall effects of the Great Recession, we now turn to the role that indus-
tries played (and perhaps more importantly, the role they did not play) in explaining these patterns.
In particular, workers are not distributed evenly across industries, so that some of the differential
employment losses reported in Panel A of Table 2.2 may be due to industry-level heterogeneity in
the severity of the recession rather than differences in how different worker types are matched to
firms within industry. The cleanest test of the hypothesis that disadvantaged workers tend to be
concentrated in less resilient firms therefore is to compare the within-industry components of the
total and predicted-from-deaths employment changes.
The bottom two panels of Table 2.2 carry out this comparison by reporting the across- and
within-industry components for the total employment changes, as well as those predicted from
establishment deaths, for white versus black workers (Panel B) and white versus Hispanic workers
(Panel C). All of the within- and across-industry components for total employment are statistically
and economically significant, and some of the deaths counterparts are significant as well.
Focusing on the total employment effects in the first column, it should be clear that the over-
all patterns presented in Panel A of Table 2.2 are potentially misleading as to the effects of the
Great Recession on employment inequality. To see why, consider the white vs. black comparison
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in Panel B. The slightly larger total employment decline for black workers stems entirely from a
much greater decline within-industry, with the distribution of black workers across industries ac-
tually serving to protect them somewhat from the downturn, relative to white workers. Accounting
for that variation, the within-total effect becomes substantially more positive (2.5 versus 1.4 per-
centage points overall). The opposite story pertains to the white-Hispanic comparison in Panel C:
white workers fared better than Hispanic workers across industries, but substantially worse within
industries, with total white employment falling by 3.2 percentage points more than the decline for
Hispanic workers.
For the white versus black comparisons, the across and within total employment effects agree
with their deaths-based counterparts in sign if not in magnitude. Across industry, the total and
deaths-based estimates are identical at -1.1 percentage points, indicating a slight relative advantage
for black workers, although the deaths estimate is not statistically significant. Within-industry,
both estimates suggest that black workers lost significantly more employment than white workers.
However, the total effect, at 2.5 percentage points, is substantially smaller than the deaths-based
effect, at 9.1 percentage points.
In terms of total and death-based effects agreeing in sign, the white-Hispanic comparison con-
trasts with the white-black results. Establishment closures reduced employment more for white
workers across industries, with a 1.4 percentage point decline in white employment relative to His-
panic employment. However, within industries, Hispanic workers fared slightly worse, with a one
percentage point decline in employment relative to white workers (though we cannot statistically
reject this effect being zero).
The central takeaway from Table 2.2 is that black and Hispanic workers were disproportionately
concentrated in less resilient establishments within industries at the onset of the recession, though
only the estimate for the white-black comparison is statistically distinguishable from zero. Whether
due to skill differences or discrimination (the determination of which is beyond the scope of this
article), the differential within-industry concentrations of workers implied by these results has
important consequences for inequality during future downturns.
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While our primary focus is on race, the decomposition of employment changes by gender is also
worth discussing. As Online Appendix Table B.1 shows, while both men and women experienced
substantial employment losses between 2007 and 2009, the total decline for women was roughly
half the decline for men (3.5% versus 7.1%). For both men and women, the employment losses
predicted by deaths are greater than the observed losses and are highly significant. Decomposing
these differences into across and within components reveals that women were advantaged relative
to men by their distribution across industries, while losing more within industry. This pattern per-
sists for the components predicted from establishment deaths – within-industry, the point estimate
suggests that women were concentrated in relatively less robust establishments, leading to a rel-
ative employment loss versus men of 2.3 percentage points. While we are unable to statistically
reject that this within-industry deaths effect is zero based on the p-value, we are able to do so using
the confidence interval (see discussion in Section 2.1.3).
2.4 Justifying Our Approach
Recall from Section 2.1.1 that our approach relies on establishment category (deaths, births, con-
tractions, and expansions) counts correctly predicting worker-type specific employment changes
associated with that category. If they do, then the coefficients in estimating equation (2.1) should
be unbiased. Assessing the extent to which this is the case requires setting out the econometrics
of our approach in greater detail. As our primary interest centers on the death-based estimates in
Table 2.2, we focus on that component of the decomposition.
Suppose the true data generating process for the death-based type-specific employment change
is ∆Eτd,i, j = −di j · Ē
τ
d,i, j, where Ē
τ
d,i, j depends on the average size of establishments destined to
close, and the proportion of type-τ workers in such establishments, at the i − j level. Let ∆Eτd,i, j =
∆̂E
τ
i, j|d + ∆̃E
τ
d,i, j, where ∆̂E
τ
i, j|d = β̂
τ
d,idi j, with analogous expressions and decompositions for the
other establishment categories. Thus, we can be explicit about the error term in equation (2.1):
ετi j = ∆̃E
τ
d,i, j + ∆̃E
τ
b,i, j + ∆̃E
τ








d,i (and thus ∆̂E
τ
i, j|d) could be biased if di j is correlated with
the unobserved determinants of births, contractions or expansions; that is, cov(di j, ητrd,i, j) , 0.
Based on Table 2.2, the problematic case for our analysis would be downward bias for black
workers (cov(di j, ηbrd,i, j) < 0) and upward bias for white workers (cov(di j, η
w
rd,i, j) > 0). This could
only occur if the non-death establishments in jurisdictions with a higher number of establishment
deaths systematically hire (fire) black workers at a lower (higher) rate than their white counterparts,
conditional on the number of establishment births, contractions, and expansions. We view this
as unlikely, particularly given the strong out-of-sample performance of our method, discussed
below. Moreover, if firm deaths really do disproportionately affect black employment, as implied
by our estimates, the larger supply of newly-unemployed black workers should push further against
relatively low black hiring in deaths-intensive jurisdictions.
However, even if the direction of bias is problematic for our primary conclusion – that within-
industry black workers lost greater employment than white workers from establishment deaths
over the Great Recession – the magnitude of the bias would have to be fairly large to explain the
effects we find. In particular, relative to the estimated coefficient, the true coefficient for white
workers and black workers would need to be 60 percent larger and smaller, respectively, for the
true within-deaths effect associated with Panel B of Table 2.2 to be zero (see Online Appendix
Figure B.10).
Beyond this sensitivity analysis, a feasible way to assess the accuracy of our procedure for statis-
tically allocating employment changes to establishment categories is to carry out a goodness-of-fit
exercise. This entails determining how well predicted out-of-sample total employment changes
by worker type, changes in total employment inequality between worker types, and across/within
decompositions of these inequality changes accord with the observed analogues. We do so by ran-
domly splitting the full sample of counties into two equally-sized groups, with the randomization
stratified by county employment. We then estimate equation (2.1) on the first group of sampled






ex,i). Finally, we predict the
employment changes for the other group of counties (the hold-out group) using these estimated
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parameters. We repeat this procedure 500 times.
Table 2.3 reports the results of this exercise for race, comparing white workers to black workers.








]W for the hold-out samples
are very close to their observed values. Moreover, for all measures, the variance of the difference
between the predicted and observed value is uniformly small, suggesting that our approach rarely
makes large errors. Online Appendix Tables B.2 and B.3 repeat the analysis for the white-Hispanic
and male-female comparisons, respectively. In each case, the predicted values are very close to
the observed values, with relatively modest variances. The consistently accurate out-of-sample
predictions of our method lends credence to our main estimates.
Table 2.3: Out-Of-Sample Fit by Race (White vs. Black)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Mean Mean SD of
Observed θ Predicted θ Difference Difference
θw -0.058 -0.058 -0.000 0.003
θb -0.072 -0.074 0.002 0.008
θw − θb 0.014 0.016 -0.002 0.007
[θw − θb]A -0.011 -0.012 0.001 0.002
[θw − θb]W 0.025 0.028 -0.003 0.008
Notes: This table presents statistics related to the out-of-sample prediction outlined in the main text.
All statistics are based on 500 randomly-drawn estimation and holdout samples, stratified on county-
level employment. Columns (1) through (3) present averages of estimates obtained for each random
draw. Column (4) presents the standard deviation of Column (3).
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we considered the extent to which the evolution of worker inequality during an eco-
nomic downturn is dictated by preexisting worker-firm matching. We did so by developing an
approach that makes use of publicly available data, exploiting variation in employment by worker
type and establishment deaths across jurisdictions. Focusing on employment changes from estab-
lishment deaths (as opposed to changes from non-closing establishments) is key for understanding
the connection between worker inequality and pre-downturn matching, given that, by definition,
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death-based changes cannot be affected by post-downturn employer favoritism toward one worker
group over another. Applying our method to analyze employment losses during the Great Re-
cession, we found that, within industry, black workers were disproportionately matched with less
resilient establishments prior to the downturn, which resulted in larger subsequent employment
losses than experienced by their white or Hispanic counterparts. Our paper lays the foundation
toward a deeper understanding of the role that economic downturns play in generating inequality.
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Chapter 3
Evaluating Regulatory Impact Assessments
in Education Policy
(with Clive Belfield† and Brooks Bowden‡)
3.1 Introduction
Today’s era is considered ”the golden age of evidence-based policy” due to record growth and
utilization of rigorous research to address social problems (Haskins, 2016). This movement is
intended to develop higher standards and to efficiently allocate resources toward building and
replicating programs and practices that work. A critical component inherent in this is examin-
ing efficiency through economic evaluations.
Over prior decades, a series of executive orders have been issued to establish a regulatory plan-
ning and review process to make federal policy more efficient, that is, in favor of policies where the
benefits justify the costs (since Executive Order No. 12,291, 1981). Generally, government utilizes
regulation to intervene when market failure exists to ensure that the economy continues to progress
†Department of Economics, Queens College, City University of New York
‡Education Policy Division, Graduate School of Education, University of Pennsylvania
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according to the values established by society (Nas, 2016). This Executive Order built upon that
framework by requiring economic evaluation of the costs and benefits of any significant federal
regulation having an effect on the economy of US$100 million or more, an adverse material effect,
or an inconsistency with another agency or action (Executive Order No. 12,866, 1993). President
Obama reaffirmed this order in 2011 to ensure that the regulatory system protects ”public health,
welfare, safety, and our environment while promoting economic growth, innovation, competitive-
ness, and job creation” (Executive Order No. 13,563, 2011). The most recent Executive Order
on Regulatory Reform (January 26, 2017) proposes a ”two-for-one” regulatory exchange process:
Each new regulation can only be adopted if two existing regulations are removed (Peacock, 2016).
Generally, the federal role in education is to guide discussion of the policy agenda, to provide
supplemental support for educational programming at the K-12 level, and to provide policies and
support for postsecondary education institutions and students. In order to continue to build our use
of evidence in policy-making within education and to ensure that our policies are efficient, it is
important that we examine the economic evaluations conducted of federal education regulations to
continue to improve the quality and relevance of this evidence base.
The primary method for economic evaluation is benefit-cost analysis (BCA; see Boardman
et al., 2017; Institute of Medicine, The National Research Council, 2014; Karoly, 2012; Levin
et al., 2017). As described in detail by Vining and Weimer (2010), this method can be adapted
to evaluate social policy interventions, including those in education. Straightforwardly, policy
makers and education professionals should decide in favor of policies that have greater benefits
than costs. As a tool that guides policy, the quality of BCA becomes crucial: Costs and benefits
should be estimated with precision to the extent possible; if elements that are not easily quantifiable
are included in the analysis, transparent statements of their assumptions should be made available;
and benefits should be mapped into costs in a clear and explicit way. Hence, good quality analysis
should yield an economic metric that can guide investment of public (and private) funds. Of course,
BCA is only one tool that is available to the policy maker to aid in decision-making; ultimately, the
decision maker must make a reasoned determination, recognizing society’s preferences and goals
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as well as existing practices.
Fundamentally, BCA is justified insofar as it improves the quality of decision-making (Posner,
2000; Revesz and Livermore, 2008). If the results of BCAs help to improve policy, these analyses
should be performed. In order to improve decision-making, however, BCAs need to be performed
to a high methodological standard (see Farrow and Zerbe, 2013).
In this article, we critically evaluate prior BCA of education regulations at the federal level.
We begin by documenting the many practical challenges in performing BCA and reviewing the
quality of BCAs in other policy fields. We then evaluate the quality of education policy BCAs
as performed by the federal government. First, we collate findings from a checklist appraisal
of each BCA. Next, we review a subset of (relatively) high-quality BCAs. This appraisal and
review illustrates the many ways in which federal attempts at benefit-cost evaluation differ from
social BCA. We conclude with discussion of the implications for policy when BCAs fall short of
accepted methodological standards.
3.2 BCA From Policy to Theory to Practice
BCA plays an important role in determining the efficiency of federal policies. Executive branch
agencies promulgate regulations to implement laws enacted by the Congress. Under Executive
Order No. 12,866 (1993), each agency must prepare a unified regulatory agenda containing the
regulatory plans of the most important significant regulatory actions that it expects to issue in that
fiscal year. These plans are then forwarded it to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(OIRA).
Together with the relevant agency, OIRA plays an integral role in reviewing these regulatory
plans and ensuring they are not in conflict with other policies.1 Once OIRA notifies the agency
1For example, plans by one agency are usually revised by other agencies to identify possible conflicts and com-
ments; these conflicts must be notified to the administrator of Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA)
who in turn must notify the affected agencies and other relevant parties. Additionally, any other planned regulatory
action that the administrator of OIRA believes to be inconsistent with the President’s priorities or may be in conflict
with another policy must also be notified. The administrator of OIRA must also chair a regulatory working group to
serve as a forum to assist agencies in identifying and analyzing important regulatory issues. Finally, the administrator
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that the review is completed and that there are no further considerations, the regulatory action then
becomes a final rule and is published in the Federal Registry. Major final rules must go through
Congress to be approved. One important component of this review is the application of BCA;
this form of analysis helps policy makers come to a ”reasoned determination” as to whether to
implement policy.
The basic theory of BCA is well-established. There are several excellent textbook treatments of
BCA, its principles, and theoretical foundations (Adler et al., 2006; Boardman et al., 2017; Farrow
and Zerbe, 2013). Recently, however, it is the practical application of BCA that has received more
scrutiny (for an overview, see Belfield (2015); for how to read BCAs, see Dudley et al. (2017)).
This scrutiny has highlighted two main concerns - the lack of BCAs and the quality of the BCAs
that are performed.
A number of studies have drawn attention to the limited application of BCA. In a recent review,
Ellig (2016) concludes that ”regulatory agencies often adopt regulations without knowing whether
a given regulation will really solve a significant problem, whether a more effective alternative
solution exists, or whether a more targeted solution could achieve the same result at lower cost.” So,
there are not enough BCAs to determine whether the most efficient policy has been implemented
and, even when attempted, BCAs are often incomplete. Checklist studies have counted the ways
in which BCA is not fully performed. Hahn and Dudley (2007) reviewed 78 regulations and found
that only 65% considered costs, 22% considered benefits, and 12% considered benefits minus
costs. This work is summarized in (Table 1). This lack of BCA is not just a concern across federal
departments. Even as other agencies conform to different standards, their economic evaluations
have also been found to be incomplete. For example, in a review of practices at the state level,
Schwartz (2010) found BCAs to be very infrequently performed by state legislatures. Also, there
has been extensive inquiry into the inadequacy and inconsistency of regulatory impact assessments
(RIAs) across the European Union and the United Kingdom (Dunlop and Radaelli, 2016; Fritsch
et al., 2017).
of OIRA must meet quarterly with representatives of state, local, and tribal governments to identify both existing and
proposed regulations that may uniquely or significantly affect those governmental entities.
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The second concern is that the BCAs that are performed - even the incomplete ones - are not
of high quality. On the one hand, there are many challenges in estimating costs. These include
gaining access to proprietary data, identifying resources across agencies, miss-specifying business-
as-usual, pre-implementation or noncompliance behaviors, technological change, and program in-
fidelity (see Harrington et al., 2000).
On the other hand, there are also many challenges in estimating benefits. Uncertainty in the
estimation of benefits can come from several sources. First, it is unclear how, and the extent
to which, institutions comply with regulations. The compliance strategy institutions adopt dictate
both the cost structure and the benefits generated by the regulatory action. Second, once institutions
have adopted the new regulation, its causal impact on the target population (such as students and
institutions) is usually hard to identify. Some policies are not easily amenable to BCA (e.g., if they
mostly involve transfers or have strong equity implications that cannot be precisely modeled or
necessitate normative approaches). Third, even if the causal estimates are identified, monetization
of the benefits (and costs) is subject to the derivation of shadow prices for nonmarket goods (Ellig
and McLaughlin, 2012), which are sensitive to the assumptions used to recover them. Sunstein
(2014b) proposes a number of ways to respond; nevertheless, these challenges must usually be
overcome in each BCA.
Moreover, the lack of BCAs makes it harder to perform high-quality BCAs. With few studies,
there are even fewer methodological inquiries (e.g., for sensitivity testing or shadow pricing). Also,
although there are guidance manuals (e.g., Office of Management and Budget Circular A-4), there
are little precedence to help evaluators harmonize with, or compare against, their analysis.
Here, we examine the extent to which these concerns - particularly regarding the quality of
BCA - are valid for economic evaluation of education policies and programs. There are two main
reasons why it is important to evaluate the practice of BCA in education policy at the federal level.
One reason is that the current quantity of BCA in education is insufficient. Although there are
a few high-quality BCAs within education, these focus almost exclusively on the returns to one
reform - preschool (Garcı́a et al., 2017; Heckman et al., 2010; Nores et al., 2005). Moreover,
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these BCAs are of small-scale programs that do not enroll many children and have budgets of
less than US$10 million; and, typically, they are retrospective in that the preschool programs have
already been implemented. By contrast, federal regulations affect multiple cohorts of students
across the United States with economic effects of billions of dollars; typically, these regulations
require a benefit-cost appraisal that is prospective and so might influence whether and how the
policy is implemented. Thus, even within a policy realm where there are too few BCAs generally,
education policy receives relatively little attention.
A second reason is that there are specific challenges in undertaking BCAs of educational poli-
cies. One challenge is that many educational policies involve large-scale transfers. Posner (2003)
has discussed this aspect at length: Transfers are not amenable to BCA (they almost certainly fail
a benefit-cost test because transfers are not benefits); and evaluators have been reluctant to apply
cost-effectiveness analysis as an alternative (despite its inclusion in Executive Order No. 12,866,
1993). A second challenge arises because education policies have features that make them, ac-
cording to Sunstein (2014b), ”Hard Cases”: They have significant distributional and equity conse-
quences and/ or their benefits are heavily loaded on specific individuals (students). Also, as Vining
and Weimer (2010) note, social BCAs require significant sensitivity testing; this leaves open the
possibility that an efficiency ruling cannot be clearly determined. Finally, the field of educational
research does not place a strong emphasis on BCA. Indeed, in its most recent guidance document
on evidence to strengthen education investments, the US Department of Education (2016) does not
consider the application of cost analysis or BCA. Thus, even as BCAs are challenging across many
policy domains (e.g., environmental and health policy), there are a number of specific challenges
for BCAs in education policy.
53
3.3 Method for Evaluating BCAs
Our evaluation focuses on federal education policies for which a BCA is expected.2 Our evidence
is taken from OIRA reports on all 28 education regulations over the most recent decade from 2006
to 2015 that were deemed economically significant and so for which some form of RIA was per-
formed. A regulatory action is defined to be economically significant if the regulation is expected
to have an annual effect on the economy of US$100+ million; may create a serious inconsistency
or interfere with an action taken or planned by another agency; alters the budgetary impact of en-
titlements, grants, user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of recipients; or raises
novel legal or policy issues. A summary list of the 28 RIAs is given in Table C.3 of Appendix C.
Under Executive Order No. 12,866, 1993, the issuing agency must provide an assessment of
the potential costs and benefits of all economically significant regulatory actions. The assessment
of these potential costs and benefits must be, to the extent feasible, quantified. In addition, these
costs and benefits should be compared to potentially effective and reasonably feasible alternatives
of the planned regulation. Thus, each RIA should include some attempt at BCA.
We use two approaches to evaluating these education RIAs. The first is a checklist method of
all 28 RIAs. Evaluators have criticized checklists and scorecards on several grounds: the use of
unclear terms for scoring; ad hoc weighting of scores across items; and the vagueness of using the
same scorecard for accountability, communications, and process improvement purposes (Fritsch
and Kamkhaji, 2016; Radaelli and Fritsch, 2012). However, this method has been used successfully
by Hahn and Dudley (2007) and Shapiro and Morrall (2016). Also, our checklist is adapted to
the specifics of educational interventions and looks at the basic requirements for a satisfactory
BCA. Thus, it provides only a rudimentary understanding of why RIAs take the form they do and
whether that is actually the most appropriate form of evaluation. Therefore, our second approach
to evaluating these RIAs is by direct review. We examine in detail the seven most complete BCAs
to assess their validity as an economic evaluation of the proposed policy.
2For many regulations and policies, benefit-cost analyses are not required. The reviewed studies are on regulations
and policies where there is a requirement.
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3.3.1 Checklist Approach
There is great variation in the way assessment of benefits and costs is done across regulatory
actions. Therefore, we try to capture in our data the depth of analysis each planned regulation uses
in their BCA. The information is classified and gathered as follows.
Costs. The cost analysis performed in each regulatory report is coded into four levels. These
levels represent progressively more extensive cost analyses. First, cost analyses are classified
as ”stated” if there is any reference in the report to resource use other than budget allocations
and if there is some description of how the resources required correspond to the policy being
implemented. Second, cost analyses are classified as ”ingredients” if there is a list of resource
ingredients needed or description of them with detail. Third, cost analyses are coded as ”agency”if
there is any discussion of costs incurred by other agencies. Finally, cost analyses are coded as
”dollar value calculated” if there is a dollar value assigned to cost. This last code is the most
extensive type of cost analysis (although we note that regulations can and do calculate costs without
considering ingredients or costs to other agencies).
Benefits. Similarly, benefit analyses are also classified into four levels that reflect the depth
of the analysis. Analogous to the costs classification, benefits are classified as stated if there is
any reference in the report to monetized benefits of the proposed policy. Next, benefit analyses
are coded as ”described” if there is a description of how the benefits are estimated. Third, benefit
analyses are coded agency if there is any discussion of benefits from multiple perspectives. Finally,
benefit analyses are classified as ”calculated” if there is a dollar value assigned to the benefits.
BCA. In order to capture how benefits are weighed against costs, we attempted to assign two
different measures. The first coding is ”net present value” (NPV) and refers to analyses where
an NPV (benefit minus cost) dollar value is reported. The second coding is ”B/C” and is for
analyses which plausibly assert that the benefits exceeded the costs (but do not provide a numerical
estimate).
Additional information. In addition to the information collected above, one other coding was
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derived from the OIRA documentation. This coding captured the methodological transparency of
the analysis. Studies were coded according to whether the report clarifies assumptions used in
terms of interest rates, inflation, discount rates, and time frame. Information about these assump-
tions is necessary for researchers to adjudicate on the quality of each BCA and to compare results
from these BCAs with other analyses.
For each of the 28 RIAs, the information was coded separately by two persons. There were very
few discrepancies; these were reconciled in discussions.
3.3.2 Text Review
Given the results from our checklist, we reviewed the RIAs to determine what efforts were made
to perform an economic evaluation congruent with Executive Order No. 12,866, 1993. For the
text review, we selected the seven highest quality RIAs for detailed interpretation and assessment.
(These RIAs are shaded in Table C.3 of Appendix C). The review allowed us to assess in detail what
type of analysis was performed, how the analysis was structured, and the most salient modeling
assumptions and shadow price valuations. These seven specimens are used to assess the quality
and features of BCAs-conditional on BCA actually having been performed.
3.4 Evaluating Educational BCAs: Summary Findings
Summary findings on the quality of educational BCAs at the federal level are derived from the
checklist analysis. These checklist results are given in Table 3.1. Most of the RIAs perform
some form of cost analysis. Almost all (93%) make a statement about social costs, that is, costs
beyond simple budgetary allocations. One quarter (25%) make an attempt to estimate costs by
distinguishing the quantity of inputs and their prices. Almost one half (54%) investigate cost
implications for different government agencies or levels. In addition, approximately three quarters
(71%) of the RIAs is a dollar value of costs reported.
The RIA benefit analyses are significantly weaker. Only four fifths (82%) state the benefits that
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Table 3.1: Checklist Evaluation of 28 Federal RIAs
Checklist Criteria Percentage Performing Activity
Cost
Statement of costs beyond budgetary statement (stated) 93
Estimated costs using ingredients method (ingredients) 25
Estimated costs separately by agency (agency) 54
Dollar value of costs reported (calculated) 71
Benefits
Statement of monetized benefits (stated) 82
Description of benefits estimation (described) 29
Estimated benefits separately by agency (agency) 57
Dollar value of benefits reported (calculated) 4
Net Present Value (NPV; benefits minus costs)
Dollar value calculated (NPV) 0
Stated as positive (B>C) 100
Methodology
Assumptions described (year, inflation, discount rate) 36
Notes: RIAs from 2006 to 2016 are listed in Appendix Table C.3. RIA=regulatory impact assessment.
are expected from the legislation and only one third (29%) describe these benefits in some detail.
Half (57%) of the RIAs do look at different benefits across government. Notably, only one study
(4%) calculated a dollar value of benefits.
Together, these frequencies mean that no RIA calculated a dollar value for the NPV or was
able to assert how benefits might exceed costs. Also, we find that only one third (36%) of RIAs
adequately documented key methodological assumptions.
For the seven highest quality BCAs, the checklist results are given in Table 3.2. For these
studies, almost all performed a full cost analysis: They estimated resource use using a version of
the ingredients method, separated out costs by agency, and reported a dollar value for costs. With
respect to benefits, most of the studies stated the benefits, described them, and apportioned them
across agency; however, none calculated the dollar value of benefits. Therefore, even across these
high-quality studies, no NPV estimate was reported. Also, less than half of these studies clearly
reported the assumptions used.
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Table 3.2: Checklist Evaluation of Seven High-Quality Federal Regulatory Impact
Assessment
Checklist Criteria Percentage Performing Activity
Cost
Statement of costs beyond budgetary statement (stated) 100
Estimated costs using ingredients method (ingredients) 86
Estimated costs separately by agency (agency) 100
Dollar value of costs reported (calculated) 86
Benefits
Statement of monetized benefits (stated) 86
Description of benefits estimation (described) 57
Estimated benefits separately by agency (agency) 86
Dollar value of benefits reported (calculated) 0
Net Present Value (NPV; benefits minus costs)
Dollar value calculated (NPV) 0
Stated as positive (B>C) 100
Methodology
Assumptions described (year, inflation, discount rate) 43
Other
Average budget allocation ($billion) US$3.532
Median year 2010
As an additional exercise, we reported the checklist results for groups of regulations by year
and budget allocation. The results are reported in Tables C.1 and C.2 of Appendix C. These results
show that the quality of BCAs is not improving over time, although there is some indication that
higher cost regulations receive a more intensive application of BCA.
Overall, these findings show that most educational BCAs performed by the federal government
are incomplete. These findings are similar to reviews of economic evaluations in other sectors (e.g.,
from Hahn and Tetlock, 2008; Ellig, 2016; Shapiro and Morrall, 2016). However, we emphasize
two points. First, although we contend there are significant informational and policy gains from
performing complete BCAs, complete analyses may not be essential for justifying policy decisions.
As noted above, policy decisions may be obvious after a basic review of costs and benefits; or
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policy decisions may be justifiable based on a ”reasoned determination,” taking account of the fact
that ”some costs and benefits are hard to quantify” (Executive Order No. 12,866, 1993). Second,
in no way should we conclude that these policies have a negative NPV, rather the magnitude of the
NPV - and possibly its sign - is uncertain.
3.5 Assessing the Quality of Educational BCAs
We base our assessment of the quality of educational RIAs on a thorough review of seven of the
highest quality BCAs. These RIAs included sufficient information for us to assess the quality of
BCA when a reasonable attempt at analysis has been made. We find that the practice of BCA differs
considerably from, and in some important ways does not meet, the methodologies and protocols
as prescribed in textbooks (Boardman et al., 2017). These differences extend across estimation of
both costs and benefits as well as across how a BCA is structured. However, the most important
distinction is that these RIAs do not perform social BCA as it is commonly understood: Their
actual analyses are far more constricted and narrow.
3.5.1 Estimating Costs
The first concern is that some costs are not accounted for in federal BCAs. Notably, some RIAs
only considered the resources required to perform new tasks and did not consider the resources
required to be in a position to perform these new tasks. Crucially, in order to perform new tasks,
workers must be trained and new managerial and organizational procedures need to be developed.
The resources required for training, management, and organization were not taken into account.
For example, regulations to limit the eligibility length for direct subsidized student loans have cost
consequences for colleges. The RIA only includes the ”reporting and financial aid counseling
activity” to conform to this rule; changes colleges must make to program offerings (as student
enrollment patterns change) are not included.
Second, although most regulations did account for the time burden on professional staff, they
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used very low estimates of time costs. That is, they typically assigned a value in the range of US$25
- US$30 per hour. This is a low value for a professional occupation: Bureau of Labor Statistics
(2015) data show estimates of education administrators time in postsecondary education at US$49
per hour. It is also an underestimate in that there was no information on whether employer costs
of compensation or overheads were included. It is therefore likely to be an underestimate of the
opportunity cost of professional staff, that is, their value in alternative roles. Also, studies rarely
reported any resource use by the professional staff such as office space or computer use.3
Review of the RIAs generated additional concerns. An implicit assumption was that all inputs
are variable and neither fixed costs nor economies of scale were salient. Hence, it would be possible
to either reduce inputs and save the full expenditure (input times input price) or increase inputs
without facing an upward-sloping supply of inputs (increasing input prices). In practice, it would
seem plausible to assume that there are some fixed costs and that marginal costs would exceed
average costs. A final concern is that, for all regulations, in few of the RIAs were the sourcing
and methods for calculating costs clear. In particular, few RIAs specify whether the accounting,
survey, or full ingredients method was used even as results will likely differ depending on which
method was used (Levin et al., 2017, Chapter 4).
3.5.2 Estimating Benefits
As shown in the checklist analysis, few RIAs reported benefits in sufficient detail. Even in the
highest quality BCAs, benefits usually were only stated and were not explored further.
As well as precluding calculation of NPV, this omission is especially important for educational
BCAs. For educational BCAs, distributional issues are salient; in some cases, they are central or
integral to the policy. (We recognize that distributional issues are important in many BCAs: On
these issues for environmental BCAs, see Robinson et al., 2016). Regulatory actions often require
resource commitments from - and convey benefits to - various groups such as students, state ed-
3An important exception is RIN 1840-AD01 (High School Equivalency Program and College Assistance Migrant
Program, The Federal TRIO Programs, and Gaining Early Awareness and Readiness for Undergraduate Program,
2010), where the issuing agency specifically accounts for an overhead at 50% of the salary and computer time and
printing costs.
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ucation agencies, local education agencies, or the federal government. It is important to establish
whether each group receives benefits that outweigh the costs and that each group is treated equi-
tably. These distributional considerations were rarely reported. For example, Regulation Identifier
Number (RIN) 1840-AD01, a regulation of the College Assistance Migrant Program, states that
there is no need to discuss the changes to the regulations . . . because the changes
to regulations for these programs were minor. The most significant changes . . .
address who can be considered an immediate family member of a migrant individual
in order to be eligible for program services.(High School Equivalency Program and
College Assistance Migrant Program, The Federal TRIO Programs, and Gaining Early
Awareness and Readiness for Undergraduate Program, 2010)
The fact that agencies do not address equity issues is not a feature of the benefit analysis only.
Differential burden of costs across populations is not considered either in any of the regulatory
actions reviewed.4
3.5.3 Analyzing Costs and Benefits Together
We identify three areas where the joint analysis of costs and benefits should be improved so as to
conform more closely to recommended standards and thresholds (Zerbe et al., 2013).
Few BCAs considered alternative policy options. Under Executive Order No. 12,866, 1993,
costs and benefits of the proposed regulation are to be compared to costs and benefits of alterna-
tive, feasible regulations. Only a few of the RIAs included any consideration of alternatives and
those RIAs typically referred to an alternative of ”no implementation” (rather than the next best
alternative).
Also, no sensitivity analyses of the estimated costs, benefits, or NPVs are reported.5. Sensi-
tivity analysis is especially important for prospective BCAs where decision makers need to know
4For example, RIN 1840-AD13 (William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, 2013), a regulatory action that
proposes changes to the William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, considers costs to student that become ineli-
gible for the program’s loans due to the proposed changes. However, there are no equity issues addressed as to which
students might carry this burden.
5For example, RIN 1840-AC94 (High School Equivalency Program and College Assistance Migrant Program, The
Federal TRIO Programs, and Gaining Early Awareness and Readiness for Undergraduate Program, 2010; William D.
Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, 2013) that proposes to amend the Federal Perkins Loan Program, Federal Family
Education Loan Program, and William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program makes projections of costs with clear
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the possible downside risks. This is particularly interesting for some regulatory actions where
projections of costs over time are made.
Finally, the RIAs typically fail to apply the proportionality principle. That is, they fail to allocate
the most attention to the most important factors in their BCA.6 Application of the proportionality
principle is especially important, given the limited resources federal staff has to perform BCAs.
3.5.4 Administrative Burden BCA
On review, we find that the educational RIAs performed by the federal government are a partic-
ular type of BCA. Based on how the RIAs interpret costs, these BCAs do not calculate costs of
implementing a policy. Instead, they calculated costs of documenting compliance with regulations
(in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995). Instead of evaluating a policy as a
social investment and applying social BCA, the RIAs were actually evaluating how to implement
a policy or a change in policy. We refer to these as ”administrative burden” BCAs. They differ in
three distinct ways from social BCA.
First, these administrative burden BCAs use a very particular approach to calculate costs. As
one example, we refer to RIN 1840-AD02 (Program Integrity Issues, 2010) that relates to institu-
tional eligibility under the Higher Education Act of 1965. The RIA does not attempt to calculate
the costs and benefits of the new number of eligible institutions. Instead, the RIA is directed to-
ward estimating the administrative burden of changing eligibility status. The administrative burden
increase for this regulation is estimated at US$126 million over 5 years. This burden is calculated
as a product of the hours worked and the hourly wage rate, but it is not derived from a formal
costing exercise using the ingredients method. Instead, the costs are estimated using what we refer
to as a ”conveyor belt” approach. For each student, the regulation necessitates a change in status or
assumptions of program and job participation, working hours, time frame, and discounting used. However, none of
these assumptions are varied to see how they might affect the final estimate.
6In RIN 1840-AD02 (Program Integrity Issues, 2010), for example, there are 15 new regulatory changes. Each
one receives approximately equal attention in the costing exercise. However, the regulatory changes vary dramatically
in their cost implications: One change requires only 628 hr of new administrative time; another change requires
2,080,800 hr of regulatory time. Clearly, the latter change should be subject to much greater analytical scrutiny than
the former.
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eligibility; this change is estimated to take x minutes of personnel time. Therefore, if the college
has 100 students, then the cost is 100x multiplied by the wage rate of personnel (if 10,000 students,
the cost is 10,000x times the wage rate).
This conveyor belt approach is incomplete and potentially misleading. First, it does not account
for other costs such as overheads, management, or facilities. Instead, the conveyor belt approach
focuses on marginal costs of performing an administrative task; it assumes administrative changes
can be placed on top of existing reporting structures and do not require additional capital, man-
agerial personnel, or computer systems. Second, it does not account for the scale of operations: It
assumes that there are no fixed costs to changing administrative burdens and no resources are re-
quired for training personnel to meet new administrative requirements. Instead, the full ingredients
approach requires identification of the inputs and their prices to implement a regulatory change at
a college of a prescribed scale, that is, to estimate a cost function with fixed and variable costs.
Second, the administrative burden approach significantly restricts what can appropriately be
considered as a benefit. With an administrative burden approach, the benefits are from compliance
with a regulation and it is difficult to describe and calculate these benefits. It may be tempting to
consider regulations as unnecessarily onerous and so having zero benefits: Any reduction in com-
pliance costs should therefore have a positive NPV. Nevertheless, it is still important to specify the
benefits of reducing administrative burdens. For example, the stated benefits of RIN 1840-AD02
(Program Integrity Issues, 2010) are that these administrative changes will lead to more accurate
determination of status as a college student eligible for federal support and ”greater transparency
for borrowers” (p. 66971). Neither of these benefits is quantified; no attempt is made even to
bound the value of these benefits so that they might be compared to the costs. (There are also
other vague benefits, including ”increased clarity about incentive compensation for employees at
institutions of higher education.”) Administrative regulations typically require colleges to provide
information; an economic evaluation would consider whether the administrative burden is justified
in terms of the information obtained. The value of this information depends on how much the new
information changes the expected value of a given policy; this value is often difficult to estimate
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(see the discussion in Boardman et al., 2017, Chapter 10).
The distinction between a social BCA and an administrative burden BCA is most clearly il-
lustrated with RIN 1840-AD15 (Program Integrity: Gainful Employment, 2014), a regulation to
change eligibility for Pell grants. This regulatory change would cost US$126 million to imple-
ment, but it would yield savings of US$4.3 billion in Pell grants not taken over the subsequent
decade. Yet these ”savings” are only benefits if we adopt an administrative burden perspective (in
some BCAs, they would be considered as transfers). From a social perspective, the reduction in
Pell grants is not a benefit unless all those Pell grants produced zero human capital for the recipi-
ents (and even under that very unlikely scenario, policy makers might still be concerned about the
regressive effect of reducing Pell grants).
The third and final observation about administrative burden BCAs relates to their correspon-
dence to new regulatory directives. As noted in the Introduction section, the January 2017 Exec-
utive Order proposes a ”two-for-one” regulatory exchange process. (Before this Executive Order,
the U.S. approach to reviewing existing regulations was a more formal and structured ”look-back”
approach (Sunstein, 2014a).) This order accords directly with BCAs that are essentially about ad-
ministrative burdens: A new regulation with an administrative burden of $X million can only be
implemented if two existing regulations with administrative burdens of $2X million are rescinded.
(Similar approaches have been adopted in other countries, e.g., Canada, the United Kingdom, and
Australia.) Given the lack of consideration of benefits in the ”two-for-one” regulatory exchange
process, the desirability of regulations is yet harder to define, when considering either social or
administrative scopes. Leaving aside the desirability, efficiency, and practicality of this type of
Executive Order, it prioritizes administrative burden BCA.
3.6 Summary and Conclusion
Methods and theories for performing BCA are clearly described in textbooks (Boardman et al.,
2017; Zerbe et al., 2013). And, the need for BCA is clear: As summarized by Dudley et al., 2017,
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p.201, ”Regulatory impact analysis can be an invaluable method for transparently evaluating con-
tentious policy choices before they are put in effect.” However, the practice of BCA is important.
Our findings for regulatory impact assessments of education policies at the federal level demon-
strate that - in the infrequent instances in which it is undertaken - practice falls short of method-
ological standards in a number of ways. Cost estimates appear to be underestimated and lack
transparency with respect to method and assumptions. Benefit estimates are very infrequent and
analyses often lack sensitivity testing, proportionality, and a reasonable counterfactual. Overall,
these findings on costs, benefits, and economic metrics echo those in other reviews of regulatory re-
view standards (e.g. Hahn and Tetlock, 2008; Shapiro and Morrall, 2016; Shapiro and Morrall III,
2012). Most notably, these RIAs are not attempts at social BCA but instead are evaluations of
administrative burdens; this focus unavoidably affects the structure of economic evaluation and
impairs our ability to use BCA as a tool in policy-making.
We share the concern of Gordon (2016) that BCA should guide decision-making, rather than
being an instrument of justification of an already determined policy. In addition, in order for
BCA to provide said guidance, it must be of high quality if it is to be informative in the decision-
making process. There are a number of remedies beyond simply exhorting analysts to perform
more rigorous analyses. Certainly, more time and funding should be provided, so that analysts can
undertake more rigorous study. A full application of the ingredients method and shadow pricing
of benefits requires a similar level of research resources as an impact evaluation. More training for
analysts may be desirable, as well as a greater emphasis on harmonizing studies for comparative
purposes.
In addition, we suggest the following recommendations that could help strengthen the BCAs




Several RIAs include a description of possible benefits to students, but none attempt to estimate
the number of students receiving these benefits or the dollar value of these benefits. We encourage
the government agencies to assign a number, along with a measure of its precision or a confidence
interval. This estimate of the number of beneficiaries of a new regulation could be varied in the
sensitivity analysis to verify the importance of the assumption on the overall results.
Performing a rigorous estimation of benefits may not be plausible for government agencies,
given limited time and other resource constraints. Therefore, we suggest that government agencies
refer to external rigorous benefit calculations, such as those provided by the Washington State
Institute for Public Policy. The match between prior estimates and the RIA under consideration
need not be exact as this can be varied in sensitivity analyses.
3.6.2 Costs
Most RIAs only refer to costs incurred by the funding agency or by other government agencies.
This is what we refer to as administrative burden BCA. Only a few RIAs consider costs to students
and education institutions. We encourage government agencies to consider multiple perspectives
and all associated costs of regulations.
3.6.3 Benefit-Cost
A very important step missing for all RIAs analyzed is that none of them match the costs with the
benefits. This may be in part due to the lack of quantified benefits within the RIAs reviewed. We
strongly suggest that whenever benefits are quantifiable, government agencies should include in
the BCAs a comparison of the benefits to the costs in a simple subtraction (B-C) or a ratio (B:C).
Ultimately, the objective of quantifying and valuing costs and benefits is to provide guidance in
the decision-making process. Weighing costs against benefits, whether it is a subtraction or a ratio,
is the most important and useful result of a BCA to policy makers, and it should be estimated
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whenever possible.
At a more basic level, RIAs need to be more explicit in three respects. One is the alterna-
tive policy options that are under consideration: Explaining why specific options were chosen is
necessary but often these choices are presumed. A second is that the theory of action is often un-
clear: Education policies are complex and may bring about change in many different ways. (These
2 items match with the primary tips Dudley et al. (2017) suggest to readers of RIAs.) Finally,
the third basic clarification relates to which type of analysis - social BCA or administrative burden
BCA - is being undertaken. The choice between them has fundamental consequences for economic
evaluation. In particular, we believe social BCAs should be prioritized over administrative BCAs.
Currently, the latter are being undertaken, perhaps giving the impression that they are equivalent to
the former. They are not. If administrative BCAs are an important analysis needed for government
agencies, these should be done as a part of the broader social BCA.
Notwithstanding these deficiencies, we believe these economic evaluations are helpful in sub-
stantiating education policy decisions. Even when RIAs fail to follow best practices or face
methodological challenges, they may still be an improvement over the alternative of no informa-
tion. More importantly, we emphasize that a lack of evidence does not imply that these regulations
are inefficient. Hundreds of studies have established the economic value of education in terms of
higher earnings, as well as in terms of private and social benefits, for those with more education
(Autor, 2014; Barrow and Malamud, 2015; Belfield and Levin, 2007). Therefore, we expect these
regulations are efficient in the sense that the benefits of the regulations exceed the costs. Neverthe-
less, it is still important to substantiate this expectation with high-quality BCAs.
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Appendix A: Chapter 1
A.1 ACT Admission Trends for UNC Campuses
Figure A.1: 25th Percentile ACT Among Admitted Students
(a) Bottom 5 Campuses (b) Top 5 Campuses
Notes: This figure shows the evolution of the average 25th percentile ACT score for admitted students of UNC campuses over time.
Panel (a) shows the evolution for the bottom five campuses. Panel (b) shows the evolution for the top five campuses. The dash red
line represent the year in which the UNC Minimum Admission Requirements were implemented. Source: IPEDS.
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A.2 Robustness of Regression Discontinuity Estimates to Band-
width Selection
Figure A.2: Regression Discontinuity Estimates with Different Bandwidths
(a) GPA (b) Absences
(c) Suspension
Notes: This figure shows regression discontinuity estimates for student senior-year outcomes as the bandwidth used for estimation
increases from 30 to 120. Panel (a) presents estimates for student GPA, panel (b) presents estimates for student absences, and panel
(c) presents estimates for student suspensions.
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A.3 Results for Raw GPA v. Weighted GPA
Figure A.3: Global Linear Fit
(a) 12th Grade Weighted GPA (b) 12th Grade GPA
Notes: This figure shows discontinuities in senior-year weighted and unweighted GPA. All panels are created by plotting the average
outcomes across each SAT score bin and fitting the data using a linear regression without controls on either side of the cutoff.
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A.4 Covariate Smoothness Scatter Plots
Figure A.4: Smoothness of Student Pre-Treatment Covariates
(a) Gender - Female (b) EDS (c) Race - African American
(d) SWD (e) AIG (f) 8th Grade Math
Notes: This figure shows discontinuities in student pre-treatment covariates. All panels are created by plotting the average outcomes
across each SAT score bin and fitting the data using a linear regression without controls on either side of the cutoff.
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Figure A.5: Smoothness of Student Pre-Treatment Outcomes
(a) 10th Grade GPA (b) 10th Grade Credits (c) 10th Grade Absences
(d) 10th Grade Times in Suspension (e) 9th Grade GPA (f) 9th Grade Credits
(g) 9th Grade Absences (h) 9th Grade Times in Suspension
Notes: This figure shows discontinuities in student pre-treatment outcomes. All panels are created by plotting the average outcomes
across each SAT score bin and fitting the data using a linear regression without controls on either side of the cutoff.
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Appendix B: Chapter 2
B.1 Additional Detail about Merging QWI with SUSB
We merge QWI and SUSB data at the county-industry level from 2007 to 2009. The 2007-08 SUSB
dataset uses the 2002 NAICS classification while the 2008-09 dataset uses the 2007 classification.
As the QWI uses the 2012 classification, we convert all industry categories to the 2012 definition
using equivalences published by the Census, before merging the data sources. While the SUSB
data contain six-digit industry codes, we use the more aggregated four-digit measure to match the
aggregation level of our QWI employment data.
Additionally, SUSB excludes some NAICS codes, including crop and animal production (NAICS
111,112), rail transportation (NAICS 482), postal service (NAICS 491), pension, health, welfare,
and vacation funds (NAICS 525110, 525120, 525190), trusts, estates, and agency accounts (NAICS
525920), private households (NAICS 814), and public administration (NAICS 92).
B.2 Additional Stylized Facts
B.2.1 Part-Time Employment
The QWI data does not distinguish between full-time and part-time employment. This compli-
cates the interpretation of our results because the Great Recession may cause shifts on both the
employed/not-employed margin and the full-time/part-time margin. Our method and data will not
detect industry responses which shift workers between part-time and full-time roles. Although we
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cannot address this concern directly, we can nonetheless present evidence that the share of part
time work is reasonably stable (1) across industries and (2) within industries over time.
(a) Across-Industry Levels
(b) Within-Industry Changes (c) Within-Industry Percent Changes
Figure B.1: Part-Time Employment Shares Across and Within Industries (2001-2015)
Notes: This figure shows the evolution of part-time employment shares across industries from 2001 to 2015 inclusive. In particular,
panels (a), (b) and (c) show yearly variation in the level, change and percent change in part-time employment, respectively.
We use the ACS to estimate the share of part-time and full-time workers by four-digit industry
code. Panel (a) of Figure B.1 plots the mean and 95% confidence interval for the share of part time
workers by industry for each ACS year (2001 to 2015). The means are around 0.15-0.18, which
matches aggregate estimates from the BLS quite well.1 Moreover, the variance in this share across
industries is fairly small each year, with the 95% confidence intervals generally spanning only
about 0.025 percentage points. The part-time share increased modestly from 0.16 to 0.18 during
the recession, suggesting across-industry stability.
1Compare BLS series LNS11000000 (total labor force) to LNS12600000 (part time labor force).
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(a) Black and Hispanic (b) Female
Figure B.2: Population Share by Type (2001-2015)
Notes: This figure shows the evolution of population share by gender and race from 2001 to 2015 inclusive. In particular, panel (a)
and (b) depict the trends for female, Black, and Hispanic people, respectively.
With respect to within-industry stability, Panels (b) and (c) of Figure B.1 show that the part-time
shares did not change very much within industry over our sample period. In 2008 and 2009, the
part time share increased for most industries, while the typical change aside from these two years
is around 0. However, even in 2009, the typical industry only saw its part-time share increase
by about 0.015 percentage points (off of a base of about 0.16 percentage points). Taken together,
these figures suggest that the distinction between part- and full-time is not an important source of
within-industry variation.
B.2.2 Population Share and Labor Force Participation by Type
To provide additional context for our results, we document trends in the population share and labor
force participation by worker type surrounding the Great Recession. Using supplemental ACS
data, Figure B.2 plots the population share for black and Hispanic people, and females over time.
As one would expect, the share of females in the population is unchanged over time. The share
of black and Hispanic people is rising during the 2000s, but the trend does not change during the
onset of the recession.
We also use the ACS data to plot the labor force participation by type in Figure B.3. There is a
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(a) White, Black and Hispanic (b) Male and Female
Figure B.3: Labor Force Participation by Type (2001-2015)
Notes: This figure shows the evolution of labor force participation by gender and race from 2001 to 2015 inclusive. In particular,
panels (a) and (b) depict the trend for gender (male and female) and race (white, black and Hispanic), respectively.
temporary uptick in the participation of all worker types during the recession, against a generally
declining trend. However, given that it is very small relative to the level of labor force participation
for each worker type, we do not expect our results in Section 2.3 to be driven by such patterns.
B.2.3 Aggregate Employment 2001-2016
(a) Aggregate
Figure B.4: Aggregate Employment Trends, Overall and by Worker Race
(2001-2016) – QWI Data
Notes: This figure shows the quarterly evolution of aggregate employment from 2001 to 2016 inclusive with and without seasonality
adjustments.
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B.2.4 Establishment Deaths and Births in the SUSB
(a) Establishment Deaths and Births (b) Employment Loss due to Deaths and Births
Figure B.5: Trends in Establishment Deaths and Births (2001-2016) – SUSB Data
Notes: Panel (a) shows the evolution of establishment deaths and births from 2001 to 2016, while Panel (b) shows the trend in
employment loss (gain) due to deaths (births) over time.
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B.3 Results by Gender
Table B.1: Employment Change Decompositions by Gender





θ f -0.035*** -0.099***
[-0.038,-0.032] [-0.112,-0.092]
(0.000) (0.000)
Panel B: Across-Within Comparisons (Male vs. Female)
Total Deaths
[θm − θ f ]A -0.045*** -0.013*
[-0.048,-0.042] [-0.029,-0.005]
(0.000) (0.062)
[θm − θ f ]W 0.009*** 0.023
[0.008,0.010] [0.007,0.060]
(0.000) (0.133)
Notes: Panel A presents employment changes during the Great Recession (2007-2009)
by worker gender, both in total (agnostic to the establishment-level cause) and for those
arising from establishment deaths. Male and female workers are denoted by m and f ,
respectively. Panel B presents estimates of equations (2.4) and (2.5) for the male-female
comparison, both in total and for establishment deaths. 95% confidence intervals and
significance are calculated using 5,000 bootstrap iterations. Confidence intervals are re-
ported in square brackets and p-values are reported in parentheses. *** and * denotes
significance at the 1% and 10% level, respectively.
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B.4 Spatial Variation
Figure B.6: Percent Employment Change 2007-2009 by County
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B.6 Heterogeneous Effects by Industry
(a) No Correction (b) Holm Bonferroni
Figure B.8: Percent Change in Employment by Industry (2007-2009)
Notes: This figure shows the industry-level average percent change of employment from 2007 to 2009 using the full sample. Light
gray points indicate industries below the median industry size (as measured by total employment in 2007), gray points indicate
industries between the median and the 90th percentile of size, and dark gray points indicate the largest industries (above the 90th
percentile of size). Panel (a) plots the average percent change in employment by industry that is statistically different than zero at
the 10% level, while panel (b) applies the Holm-Bonferroni correction to adjust significance for multiple comparisons.
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(a) Male (b) Female
(c) White (d) Black
Figure B.9: Percent Change in Employment by Industry and Gender (2007-2009)
Notes: This figure shows the percent change of employment from 2007 to 2009 inclusive for different worker types, using the QWI
sample and the Holm-Bonferroni correction. Light gray points indicate industries below the median industry size (as measured
by total employment in 2007), gray points indicate industries between the median and the 90th percentile of size, and dark gray
points indicate the largest industries (above the 90th percentile of size). Panels (a) and (b) show these changes by gender (male and
female), while panels (c) and (d) show them by race (white and black).
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B.7 Sensitivity Analysis and Goodness of Fit
Figure B.10: Sensitivity of Estimated Within and Across Components to Changes in
βb and βw
Notes: This figure shows the estimates of across and within components due to deaths when estimated coefficients of black em-
ployment change are reduced stepwise by 10% and estimated coefficients of white employment change are increased stepwise by
10%.
Table B.2: Out-Of-Sample Fit by Race (White vs. Hispanic)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Mean Mean SD of
Observed θ Predicted θ Difference Difference
θw -0.058 -0.058 -0.000 0.003
θh -0.039 -0.038 -0.001 0.009
θw − θh -0.019 -0.020 0.000 0.010
[θw − θh]A 0.013 0.013 0.000 0.002
[θw − θh]W -0.032 -0.032 0.000 0.010
Notes: This table presents statistics related to the out-of-sample prediction outlined in Section 2.4.
All statistics are based on 500 randomly-drawn estimation and holdout samples, stratified on county-
level employment. Columns (1) through (3) present averages of estimates obtained for each random
draw. Column (4) presents the standard deviation of Column (3).
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Table B.3: Out-Of-Sample Fit by Gender
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean Mean Mean SD of
Observed θ Predicted θ Difference Difference
θm -0.071 -0.070 -0.001 0.003
θ f -0.035 -0.035 -0.000 0.003
θm − θ f -0.036 -0.035 -0.001 0.002
[θm − θ f ]A -0.045 -0.044 -0.000 0.003
[θm − θ f ]W 0.009 0.009 -0.000 0.002
Notes: This table presents statistics related to the out-of-sample prediction outlined in Section 2.4.
All statistics are based on 500 randomly-drawn estimation and holdout samples, stratified on county-
level employment. Columns (1) through (3) present averages of estimates obtained for each random
draw. Column (4) presents the standard deviation of Column (3).
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Appendix C: Chapter 3
Table C.1: Checklist Evaluation of 28 Federal Regulatory Impact Assessments by
Years
Percentage Performing Activity
Checklist Criteria 2006-2010 2011-2015
Cost
Statement of costs beyond budgetary statement (stated) 100 85
Estimated costs using ingredients method (ingredients) 33 15
Estimated costs separately by agency (agency) 60 46
Dollar value of costs reported (calculated) 80 62
Benefits
Statement of monetized benefits (stated) 87 77
Description of benefits estimation (described) 47 8
Estimated benefits separately by agency (agency) 67 46
Dollar value of benefits reported (calculated) 7 0
Net Present Value (NPV; benefits minus costs)
Dollar value calculated (NPV) 0 0
Stated as positive (B>C) 100 100
Methodology
Assumptions described (year, inflation, discount rate) 33 38
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Table C.2: Checklist Evaluation of 28 Federal Regulatory Impact Assessments by
Budgetary Allocation
Percentage Performing Activity
Checklist Criteria Lower Budgets Higher Budgets
Cost
Statement of costs beyond budgetary statement (stated) 86 100
Estimated costs using ingredients method (ingredients) 14 36
Estimated costs separately by agency (agency) 43 64
Dollar value of costs reported (calculated) 71 71
Benefits
Statement of monetized benefits (stated) 86 79
Description of benefits estimation (described) 14 43
Estimated benefits separately by agency (agency) 50 64
Dollar value of benefits reported (calculated) 0 7
Net Present Value (NPV; benefits minus costs)
Dollar value calculated (NPV) 0 0
Stated as positive (B>C) 100 100
Methodology
Assumptions described (year, inflation, discount rate) 21 50
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Table C.3: Twenty-Eight Federal Regulatory Impact Assessments
Year Order Dept Regulation Description
2009 1810-AB04 OESE State Fiscal Stabilization Fund
Program–Notice of Proposed Re-
quirements, Definitions, and Ap-
proval Criteria
Formula grants to States to help stabilize State and local bud-
gets in order to minimize and avoid reductions in education and
other essential services, in exchange for a State’s commitment
to advance essential education reform in key areas.
2009 1810-AB06 OESE School Improvement Grants–
Requirements under American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act
of 2009; Title I of the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of
1965
Funds for school improvement, School Improvement Grants are
used to improve student achievement in Title I schools identified
for improvement, corrective action, or restructuring so as to en-
able those schools to make adequate yearly progress (AYP) and
exit improvement status.
2009 1810-AB07 OESE Race to the Top Fund–Notice
of Proposed Priorities, Require-
ments, Definitions, and Selection
Criteria
Encourages and rewards States that are creating the condi-
tions for education innovation and reform; achieving significant
improvement in student outcomes, closing achievement gaps,
improving high school graduation rates, and ensuring student
preparation for success in college and careers; and implement-
ing ambitious plans in four core education reform areas.
2010 1810-AB08 OESE Teacher Incentive Fund–Priorities,
Requirements, Definitions, and
Selection Criteria
Supports projects that develop and implement PBCSs for teach-
ers, principals, and other personnel in order to increase educator
effectiveness and student achievement, measured in significant
part by student growth in high-need schools.
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2012 1810-AB12 OESE Teacher Incentive Fund Support projects that develop/implement PBCSs for teachers,
principals, and other personnel to increase educator effective-
ness and student achievement, measured in significant part by
student growth, in high-need schools.
2012 1810-AB15 OESE Race to the Top–Early Learning
Challenge Phase 2
Improves the quality of early learning and development and
close the achievement gap for children with high needs.
2013 1810-AB17 OESE Race to the Top–District Supports bold, locally directed improvements in learning and
teaching that will directly improve student achievement and ed-
ucator effectiveness.
2013 1810-AB18 OESE Race to the Top–Early Learning
Challenge
Improves the quality of early learning and development and
close the educational gaps for Children with High Needs.
2006 1840-AC86 OPE Student Assistance General Pro-
visions and Federal Student Aid
Programs–Academic Competi-
tiveness and National Science and
Mathematics Access To Retain
Talent Grant Programs
These interim final regulations implement certain provisions of
the Higher Education Reconciliation Act of 2005.
2006 1840-AC87 OPE Institutional Eligibility Under the
Higher Education Act of 1965,
as Amended; Student Assistance
General Provisions and Federal
Student Aid Programs*
Reflect the provisions of the HERA that affect students, borrow-
ers, postsecondary educational institutions, lenders, and other
program participants in the Federal student aid programs autho-
rized under Title IV of the HEA.
2007 1840-AC89 OPE Federal Perkins Loan Program,
Federal Family Education Loan
Program, and William D. Ford
Federal Direct Loan Program
Amending these regulations to strengthen and improve the ad-
ministration of the loan programs authorized under Title IV of
Higher Education Act of 1965.
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2008 1840-AC93 OPE Title IV of the Higher Educa-
tion Act of 1965, as Amended
(TEACH Grant Program)
Non-need-based grant program for students who are enrolled in
an eligible program and who agree to teach in a high-need field,
at a low-income elementary or secondary school for at least four
years within eight years of completing the program for which
the TEACH Grant was awarded.
2008 1840-AC94 OPE Federal Perkins Loan, Federal
Family Education Loan (FFEL),
and William D. Ford Federal Di-
rect Loan (DL) Programs*
The Secretary amends the Federal Perkins Loan (Perkins Loan)
Program, Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) Program, and
William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan (Direct Loan) Program
regulations to implement provisions of the College Cost Reduc-
tion and Access Act of 2008 (CCRAA)
2009 1840-AC96 OPE Student Assistance General Pro-
visions; TEACH Grant, Federal
Pell Grant, and Academic Com-
petitiveness Grant, and National
Science and Mathematics Access
To Retain Talent Grant Programs
Amends the regulations for the Academic Competitiveness
Grant (ACG) and National Science and Mathematics Access to
Retain Talent Grant (National SMART Grant) Programs. These
interim final regulations are needed to implement provisions
of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (HEA), as amended by
the Ensuring Continued Access to Student Loans Act of 2008
(ECASLA) and the Higher Education Opportunity Act of 2008
(HEOA).
2009 1840-AC99 OPE General and Non-Loan Program-
matic Issues
Amends the regulations for Institutional Eligibility Under HEA
1965, the Student Assistance General Provisions, the Federal
Work-Study (FWS) Programs, the Teacher Education Assis-
tance for College and Higher Education (TEACH) Grant Pro-
gram, the Federal Pell Grant Program, and the Leveraging Edu-
cational Assistance Partnership Program (LEAP).
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2010 1840-AD01 OPE Federal TRIO Programs, Gaining
Early Awareness and Readiness
for Undergraduate Program, and
High School Equivalency and Col-
lege Assistance Migrant Programs
Helps migrant and seasonal farmworkers and their immediate
family members obtain a GED; CAMP assists students to com-
plete their first academic year of college and continue in post-
secondary education.
2010 1840-AD02 OPE Institutional Eligibility Under the
Higher Education Act of 1965;
Student Assistance General Provi-
sions
Improving integrity in programs authorized under title IV of
HEA 1965 by amending the regulations for Institutional Eli-
gibility, the Secretary’s Recognition of Accrediting Agencies,
the Secretary’s Recognition Procedures for State Agencies, the
Student Assistance General Provisions, FFEL Program, the
TEACH Grant Program, the Federal Pell Grant Program, and
the AGC and National Smart Grant Programs.
2010 1840-AD04 OPE Program Integrity: Gainful Em-
ployment
Amend the Student Assistance General Provisions to establish
measures for determining whether certain postsecondary educa-
tional programs lead to gainful employment in recognized occu-
pations, and the conditions under which these educational pro-
grams remain eligible for the student financial assistance pro-
grams authorized under title IV of HEA 1965.
2012 1840-AD05 OPE Federal Perkins Loan Program,
Federal Family Education Loan
Program, and William D. Ford
Federal Direct Loan Program
Income-Contingent Repayment (ICR) plans in the Direct Loan
program, incorporate recent statutory changes to the IBR plan
in the Direct Loan and FFEL programs, and streamline and add
clarity to the TPD discharge process for borrowers in loan pro-
grams under title IV of HEA 1965.
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2011 1840-AD06 OPE Program Integrity: Gainful
Employment-Measures
Amend the Student Assistance General Provisions to establish
measures for determining whether certain postsecondary educa-
tional programs lead to gainful employment in recognized occu-
pations, and the conditions under which these educational pro-
grams remain eligible for the student financial assistance pro-
grams authorized under title IV of HEA 1965.
2013 1840-AD11 OPE Federal Pell Grant Program Amends four sections of the Federal Pell Grant Program regula-
tions to make them consistent with recent changes in the law that
prohibit a student from receiving two consecutive Pell Grants in
a single award year.
2013 1840-AD12 OPE Transitioning from the FFEL Pro-
gram to the Direct Loan Program
and Loan Rehabilitation Under the
FFEL, Direct Loan, and Perkins
Loan Programs
Amends the FFEL and Direct Loan program regulations to re-
flect changes made to HEA 1965, by the SAFRA Act included
in the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010;
incorporate statutory changes to interest rates and other recent
statutory changes in the Direct Loan Program regulations; up-
date, strengthen, and clarify various areas of the Student Assis-
tance General Provisions, Perkins Loan, FFEL, and Direct Loan
program regulations; and provide for greater consistency in the
regulations governing the title IV, HEA student loan programs.
2013 1840-AD13 OPE William D. Ford Federal Direct
Loan Program
Amendments to ensure a borrower may not receive Direct Sub-
sidized Loans for more than 150 percent of the published length
of the educational program in which the borrower is enrolled.
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2014 1840-AD15 OPE Gainful Employment Establish measures for determining whether certain postsec-
ondary educational programs prepare students for gainful em-
ployment in a recognized occupation, and the conditions un-
der which these educational programs remain eligible under the
Federal Student Aid programs authorized under title IV of the
HEA.
2015 1840-AD18 OPE REPAYE The REPAYE plan is modeled on the existing Pay As You Earn
repayment plan, and will be available to all Direct Loan student
borrowers regardless of when the borrower took out the loans.
2010 1855-AA06 OII Investing in Innovation–Priorities,
Requirements, Definitions, and
Selection Criteria
Supports LEAs and nonprofit organizations to provide compet-
itive grants to applicants with a record of improving student
achievement and attainment.
2013 1855-AA09 OII Investing in Innovation Establish priorities, requirements, definitions, and selection cri-
teria that will enable effective grant making, resulting in the se-
lection of high-quality applicants who propose to implement ac-
tivities that are most likely to have a significant national impact
on educational reform and improvement.
2015 1855-AA12 OII Charter Schools Grants to SEAs Priorities, requirements, definitions, and selection criteria for
CSP Grants to SEAs.
2011 1894-AA01 OII Race to the Top Fund Phase 3 Requirements for Phase 3 of the Race to the Top program. In
this phase the Department intends to make awards to States that
were finalists but did not receive funding under the Race to the
Top Fund Phase 2 competition held in fiscal year 2010.
Notes: All orders ruled ”consistent with change” except * denotes ”consistent without change”. OESE=Office of Elementary and Secondary Education; OPE= Offie of Postsecondary Education; OII=Office
of Innovation and Improvement; SEA=state education agency.
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